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It is the nature of all greatness not to be exact, and great trade will always
be attended with considerable abuses.1  Edmund Burke
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INTRODUCTION
Pollution trading2 has been touted as a great innovation in envi-
ronmental policy making3 and a key tool for sustainable develop-
ment.4  Pollution trading allows a polluter to forego reductions in
pollution (or increase pollution) at its own facility in exchange for re-
ducing emissions elsewhere or by purchasing credits which represent
someone else’s pollution reduction.5  Pollution trading advocates ar-
gue that this approach saves money, promotes innovative technology,
and continuously reduces pollution through market incentives.  In
contrast, they claim that technology-based regulations, commonly re-
ferred to as ‘command and control’, are economically inefficient and
rigidly over-prescriptive.6
2. “Pollution trading” is used interchangeably with “emissions trading” to refer to one
kind of market-based environmental policy tool that provides for the buying, selling, and use of
emission reduction credits to more cost-effectively reduce pollution.  These programs have also
been called marketable permit programs or permit trading.
3. See Jeremy B. Hockenstein et al., Crafting the Next Generation of Market-Based Envi-
ronmental Tools, ENVIRONMENT, May 1997, at 13-14.  Pollution trading stands distinct from
other market-based environmental policies, which include eliminating government subsidies,
charging pollution fees, using a deposit refund system on products and reducing other market
barriers.
4. See HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 222-224 (1996) (“[T]he paradigm policy for solving the allocation, distribution,
and scale problems seems . . . to be the tradable permit plan.”).  According to Daly, economic
policy for sustainable development must solve three separate problems: efficient allocation of
resources for production, fair and adequate distribution of resources to people, and setting an
optimal scale of resource use at a point beyond which further growth costs more than it is
worth.  See id. at 222.  Daly sees great virtue in the tradable permit scheme because it forces us
to recognize and address these three problems separately through three independent policy
instruments.  See id. at 224.  It requires the scale and distribution problems to be decided so-
cially before relying on the competitive market to work out the allocation problem individualis-
tically.  See id.  Daly calls the term sustainable development “dangerously vague” and some-
thing that “everyone likes, but nobody is sure of what it means.”  See id. at 1.  The United
Nations-sponsored Brundtland Commission report, Our Common Future, defined the term as
development which meets the needs of the present without sacrificing the ability of the future
to meet its needs.  See id.
5. All the various forms of pollution trading incorporate this feature, including offsets
and bubbles for new and existing sources of air pollution (see infra Part I.B), declining cap-and-
trade programs, such as RECLAIM, see infra Part II.A, and open market trading programs,
such as car scrapping Rule 1610, see infra Part II.A.
6. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program? Re-
placing the Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
289, 296-97, 306-7 (1998) [hereinafter Driesen, Emissions Trading] (“[Proponents of economic
incentives hold] that command and control regulation generates unnecessarily high compliance
costs because the regulator, instead of deciding only how much pollution reduction to demand,
also specifies the technologies and methods firms must use to control pollution.  This may
prove inefficient because the polluter knows its facility better than the regulator and can de-
termine how to deliver any given decrease in pollution more efficiently than the regulator.”
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Pollution trading has received strong support from several quar-
ters.  Many in academia, industry, and some environmental organiza-
tions such as the Environmental Defense Fund, have endorsed pollu-
tion trading strategies.  The United States government has also grown
increasingly reliant on pollution trading to address domestic air pol-
lution problems.7  Furthermore, the United States has successfully
foisted pollution trading on the rest of world as a policy tool to com-
bat climate change, despite strong opposition from developing coun-
tries and some environmentalists.8
Academics, in particular, have been fascinated with pollution
trading for decades. A vast body of academic literature discusses the
theory and virtues of pollution trading,9 especially its promise of iden-
tifying the most cost effective means to reduce pollution.10  Some arti-
cles approach this subject with an almost religious fervor, praising the
ability of pollution trading to harness the forces of the free market
for the good of the environment.11  However, fewer studies have ex-
                                                                                                                                     
Furthermore, “because facilities have unequal compliance costs, uniform standards demand
relatively expensive reductions from some facilities without securing greater reductions from
facilities with lower compliance costs.  Hence, uniform standards may use private sector re-
sources that are devoted to pollution control inefficiently.”); Hockenstein et al., supra note 3, at
14-15.
7. See discussion infra Part I.B on the growing U.S. reliance on pollution trading.
8. See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the
Climate Change Convention, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 18-35 (1998) [hereinafter Driesen,
Cheap Fix?] (reviewing the evolution of trading, including joint implementation, in the Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regula-
tion: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677, 704-13, 735-83, 798-800
(summarizing the use of different regulatory instruments at the international level and arguing
that global environmental protection should presumptively favor quantity-based tradeable al-
lowances, due to the unique legal framework that exists at the international level).  See infra
Part IV.B. for the implications of pollution trading for climate change policy.
9. See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 300,
301, n.3 (1995) (describing support for market-based pollution regulations); Symposium, Free
Market Environmentalism: The Role of the Market in Environmental Protection, 14 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 297 (1992) (surveying market-based regulations).
10. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37
STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1346 (1985) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law (I)] (arguing that market-based pollution trading programs will save billions of dollars an-
nually).
11. See, e.g.,  Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 179-88 (1988)
[hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law (II)]; Richard B. Stewart,
Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153,
158-62 (1988); Cass Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
949, 964-66 (1991); Driesen, Emisssions Trading, supra note 6, at 295 (noting “the quasi-
religious faith in programs labeled economic incentives and [the] demonization of traditional
regulation”).
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amined the empirical evidence of what occurs on the ground as a re-
sult of trading.12
This article analyzes two of the most developed pollution trading
programs in the world—Mobile Source Credits (specifically, the Rule
1610 “car scrapping” program) and RECLAIM.  Both programs
benefit large industrial polluters in the Los Angeles area, and have
been in place for more than five years.  Although industry has saved
money, these air pollution trading programs have otherwise failed to
deliver.
The promises of pollution trading advocates have not come to
pass.  Pollution trading in Los Angeles has led to concentrated toxic
air emission hot-spots that have shackled low-income and minority
communities with the region’s air pollution.  Pollution reductions
have been far less than those promised by trading proponents.  Fur-
thermore, pollution trading has virtually eliminated public participa-
tion in the environmental decision-making process.  The lessons
learned from the Los Angeles pollution trading experiments should
inform decision making in the development and reform of domestic
and international emissions trading programs.
Part I of this article reviews the theoretical basis for emissions
trading programs.  This part also examines the trend, especially in the
last decade, of increased regulatory reliance on such market incentive
programs.
Part II describes how air emissions trading programs have
evolved in the metropolitan Los Angeles area of the South Coast Air
Basin.  This part then describes the harsh reality of emissions trading
based on the early results of the Los Angeles experiments and intro-
duces the environmental justice concerns that have called attention
to the programs’ shortcomings.  The Los Angeles emissions trading
programs have resulted in adverse public health impacts, fraud, and
manipulation of the trading market to reward the worst polluters.
Part III criticizes emissions trading by drawing on the Los An-
geles experience and examines the immorality, injustice, and ineffec-
tiveness of pollution trading.  Pollution trading undermines moral
claims that pollution is wrong by creating a ‘right’ to pollute.  It cre-
ates environmentally unjust outcomes by placing a disproportionate
12. For a few empirical surveys of emissions trading see Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L
Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY. L. Q. 361, 381-91
(1989) (trading lead credits to reduce lead in gasoline successfully reduced costs but delayed
compliance); Driesen, Emissions Trading, supra note 6, at 311-18 (reviewing pollution trading’s
mixed record of environmental performance).
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burden of the region’s air pollution on low-income communities, a
majority of which are ethnic and racial minorities.  Finally, as demon-
strated in Los Angeles, pollution trading makes for ineffective air
quality policy in at least four ways: 1) it does not significantly reduce
air pollution; 2) it does not spur technological innovation; 3) it de-
creases public participation in environmental decision-making; and 4)
it increases the difficulty of monitoring and enforcing emission reduc-
tions.
Part IV presents recommendations for reforming or altering
emissions trading proposals.  This part also examines the implications
of pollution trading in a broader context than Los Angeles.  A de-
tailed proposal to reform urban air pollution trading programs is pre-
sented.  Also, this part examines the policy implications of emissions
trading for the global climate change debate. Finally, this part briefly
outlines other market-based policy tools that may prevent the prob-
lems associated with pollution trading, while still realizing the goal of
enhancing economic efficiency.
I.  FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE:  THE GROWING RELIANCE ON
POLLUTION TRADING
The attraction of pollution trading lies in its promise to reduce
pollution as effectively as mandatory regulations, but with less ex-
pense.  Advocates argue that a trading strategy increases the range of
options for industrial plants.  They claim trading encourages some
plants to reduce extra pollution now through innovation, while it al-
lows others to wait until later to reduce pollution, when reductions
are more cost effective.  Thus, pollution trading provides regulatory
flexibility, allowing industry to simultaneously increase profits and
produce a healthier environment.
A. Pollution Trading In Theory
Traditionally, industrial air pollution has been reduced through
government regulatory programs that set emissions standards achiev-
able through available pollution control technology.  Critics of tech-
nology-based regulations assert that this traditional “command and
control” approach actually prescribes the pollution control technol-
ogy that must be installed at each facility or every category of facil-
ity.13  While command and control regulation might achieve the de-
13. See Driesen, Emissions Trading, supra note 6, at 296; Perry S. Goldschein, Going Mo-
bile: Emissions Trading Gets a Boost from Mobile Source Emission Reduction Credits, 13
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sired outcome, industry and many economists contend that such
regulation is highly inflexible, creating unnecessarily costly
(economically inefficient) outcomes.
The following illustration shows the theoretical advantages of
emissions trading programs in achieving economic efficiency.  The
government mandates that certain industrial air emissions be reduced
by fifty percent, a level determined to be achievable through the use
of the best available pollution control technology.14  Imagine three
industrial plants, with equal amounts of air emissions, which can
readily meet the pollution reduction goal, but which have different
compliance costs.  Plant A can easily switch fuels at a low cost.  Plant
B, if applying existing technology, has medium compliance costs.
Plant C faces high costs due to the difficulty of retrofitting its old
equipment and its inability to switch fuels.  If each plant were re-
quired to meet the same pollution reduction goal simultaneously,
some would face higher marginal costs of compliance.  Thus, many
economists hold that inflexible, technology-based regulation results
in economic inefficiency by requiring costly compliance regardless of
the availability of more cost-effective pollution reductions from other
sources.15
Pollution trading supposedly solves this problem by allowing the
three hypothetical facilities to buy and sell the right to pollute.  The
choice of a permissible level of pollution and the issuance of pollu-
tion reduction credits are central program elements.  Under a mar-
ket-based scheme, rather than prescribe mandatory reductions at
each plant based on a particular technology fix, the government sim-
ply mandates the overall outcome desired—for example, a fifty per-
cent reduction in emissions from all sources combined.  To reach that
                                                                                                                                     
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 225, 230 (1994/95).  However, Driesen argues that critics are
wrong; technology-based regulations set performance standards that can be met by any means
chosen by the polluter.  See id. at 297-304.
14. Often, traditional environmental regulation has required pollution to be reduced by
amounts achievable through the use of control technology already proven to be effective, af-
fordable, and already in use to some degree.  For example, the Clean Air Act requires that
Reasonably Available Control Technology (RACT) be used by existing sources to reduce air
pollution, while new industrial plants must comply with the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate
(LAER) through more state of the art controls. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVI-
RONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 776-77 (2d ed. 1996).
15. See Hockenstein et al., supra note 3, at 14 (“[Command-and-control] regulations force
all firms to shoulder identical shares of the mitigation burden, regardless of the relative costs of
this burden to them.  This is a significant drawback because experience has shown that some
firms can lower pollution at much less cost than others.  Thus, while the command-and-control
approach can effectively limit emissions of pollutants, it typically exacts unduly high societal
costs in the process.”).
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goal, each facility is granted “emissions credits” allowing that facility
to release exactly fifty percent of its current level of pollution.  The
facilities can then decide how they will reach that fifty percent goal.
If a facility can reduce its emissions by more than fifty percent, then
it can sell its surplus credits. Facilities have an economic incentive to
reduce their pollution to the maximum extent possible, since any ex-
cess reductions generate credits that can be sold to other facilities.
Returning to the above example, Plant A reduces its emissions
by seventy-five percent by switching to cleaner burning fuels.  Plant B
develops an innovative, inexpensive pollution control technology,
enabling it to reduce emissions by seventy-five percent.  Plant C,
faced with a relatively high cost of control, decides that it is too ex-
pensive to reduce emissions at all.  Instead, Plant C purchases emis-
sion reduction credits from Plant A and Plant B, both of which re-
duced emissions by an extra twenty-five percent beyond the required
minimum. The overall result is an emissions reduction equal to what
would have been achieved through the command and control model,
but at a much lower cost to industry.  Thus, by harnessing free market
forces and by expanding industry’s compliance options, the emissions
trading market has achieved the most economically efficient reduc-
tion in emissions—“more bang for the buck.”16 This model can be
replicated beyond the three hypothetical utilities in the above exam-
ple to include all facilities in a particular region, state, country, or
even the entire international community.17
Although cost savings for industry have motivated further reli-
ance on pollution trading, scholars have developed several other
theoretical arguments favoring emissions trading.  Foremost among
these is the notion that pollution trading stimulates continuous tech-
nological innovation to reduce emissions.18  Over time, as credits be-
come scarce and their prices rise, “emissions trading gives plant man-
16. See John J. Fialka, Breathing Easy: Clear Skies are Goal as Pollution is Turned into a
Commodity, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 1997, at A1 (discussing how Wisconsin Electric Power Co.
saved $100 million by buying pollution credits from other industries that had reduced their sul-
fur dioxide emissions instead of installing scrubbers); Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Envi-
ronmental Law (I), supra note 10, at 1348 (noting that “the Clean Air Act bubble policy alone,
in limited use for only a few years, has achieved compliance cost savings of over $700 million
without and reduction (and in some cases an increase) in pollution control”).
17. Global trading in carbon dioxide credits was called for in the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.  See generally Driesen, Cheap
Fix?, supra note 8.
18. See Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this Thoroughbred
Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L., 217, 219-23 (1988); Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Envi-
ronmental Law (II), supra note 11, at 171-72.
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agers the opportunity and incentive to use existing technologies, pro-
duction, process, operations, and maintenance changes in new ways
which invariably result in more emission control for less money!”19
Furthermore, some pollution trading programs are more demo-
cratic than traditional command and control regulations.20  Sunstein,
Ackerman and Stewart argue that market-based regulations will help
to reclaim community control over decisions about the environ-
ment.21  They further argue that adoption of trading programs will
encourage public participation and promote reasoned deliberation by
elected officials about environmental goals.22 Sunstein suggests that a
system based on economic incentives leaves “little room for interest-
group maneuvering . . . [and] puts the power of deciding pollution
levels back into the hands of the citizenry.”23
B. A Growing Reliance on Pollution Trading
Pollution trading has grown from its meager beginnings as an
academic theory to become a major policy tool in both domestic and
international strategies to reduce harmful pollution.  This growing
reliance demonstrates the political support for pollution trading, but
belies the emerging evidence of its real problems.
The history of environmental policy making over the last thirty
years reveals an ongoing political tension between advocates of gov-
ernment regulation and supporters of unchecked commercial enter-
prise.24  Economists suggested that market incentives, like pollution
trading, or disincentives, like pollution taxes, would be more efficient
than regulation.  Yet, this view was not reflected in the pioneering
19. Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 18, at 235.  But see infra Parts III.B.2-III.B.3.
20. See Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 311-14; Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environ-
mental Law (I), supra note 10, at 1353-55; Stewart, supra note 11, at 160, 164; Sunstein, supra
note 11, at 966-68.
21. See Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 302 (noting that Cass Sunstein, Bruce Ackerman, and
Richard B. Stewart have suggested that pollution trading programs are superior to technology-
based regulations from a democratic perspective because they begin with an explicit discussion
about what level of pollution is acceptable); Stewart, supra note 11, at 160, 164; Sunstein, supra
note 11, at 966-68.  But see discussion infra Part III.C..3.
22. See Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 302.
23. Sunstein, supra note 11, at 967.
24. See generally PHILIP SHABECOFF, A FIERCE GREEN FIRE: THE AMERICAN EN-
VIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT (1993); MARK DOWIE, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN ENVI-
RONMENTALISM AT THE CLOSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1995); ROBERT GOTTLIEB,
FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENT (1993).
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environmental legislation of the early 1970s.25  However, amidst a
growing political backlash against environmental regulations in the
late 1970s and 1980s,26 early forms of pollution trading gradually de-
veloped.27  In the 1990s, these programs have grown explosively,
driven by strong industry opposition to regulatory mandates and by
an alliance forged between business interests and some national envi-
ronmental groups.28
The first major emissions trading program, adopted in 1976 by
EPA, allowed new stationary sources of air pollution (e.g. industrial
plants) to be built in exchange for “offsets” that reduced air pollution
by a greater amount from other sources in the same region.29  A more
controversial trading program soon followed called “netting,” which
used surplus emission reductions at an existing plant to offset in-
creased pollution from expanded operations at the same facility.30
Then, in 1979, a “bubble policy” was adopted by EPA to allow exist-
ing industrial polluters to meet pollution reduction goals in the ag-
gregate through any combination of on-site emissions reductions.31  In
1984, by upholding EPA’s broad definition of an air pollution source,
the Supreme Court endorsed the use of netting and bubbles.32  EPA
memorialized these limited trading practices in its Emissions Trading
Policy Statement, which included guidance on the use and banking of
emission reduction credits.33
In the 1980s, academics actively advanced the ideal of cost-
effectiveness in environmental policy; they attacked technology-
based regulations and pushed for expanded market incentive pro-
grams.34  Their influence could be seen in a 1988 report by a biparti-
25. See Hockenstein et al., supra note 3, at 14.
26. See SHABECOFF, supra note 24, at 203-30; GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 117-61.
27. See generally, Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 18.
28. See SHABECOFF, supra note 24 at 258-60; DOWIE, supra note 24, at 105-17; GOTTLIEB,
supra note 24, at 160-61.
29. See Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 18, at 224-25.
30. This results in “no net increase” in emissions but allows avoidance of pollution control
responsibilities.  See id. at 225-26.
31. See id. at 227.
32. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984) (holding “that the EPA's definition of the term ‘source’ is a permissible construction
of the statute which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with economic
growth”).
33. Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986); see Dudek &
Palmisano, supra note 18, at 228.
34. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law (I), supra note 10, at
1341-42 (“A system of tradeable rights will tend to bring about a least-cost allocation of control
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san group called Project 88, which proposed economic incentives as a
centerpiece of future environmental policy.35  This report helped lead
to the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. This leg-
islation established a national pollution trading program for sulfur
dioxide emissions from power plants to curb acid rain.36  The 1990
Amendments also authorized states and regions to develop Eco-
nomic Incentive Programs (EIPs), including emissions trading, as
central policy strategies for reducing urban smog.37
In the 1990s, support for emissions trading has grown.  EPA and
Congress have expanded significantly the use of emissions trading to
combat urban smog.38  The Clinton Administration has expressed
strong support for market-based approaches, particularly pollution
trading.39 Many scholars and economists are aggressively calling for
the expansion of market-based regulations.40 Environmental regula-
                                                                                                                                     
burdens . . . .  It will . . . reduce the incentives for litigation, simplify the issues in controversy,
and facilitate more intelligent setting of priorities.”).
35. See Sherri Bittenberg & Robert Stavins, Project 88: Harnessing Market Forces to Pro-
tect Our Environment, HARVARD ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY CENTER WORKING
PAPER (1989); Thomas J. Graff, Harnessing Market Forces to Protect Out Environment, 20
EDF COLUMN 1, ¶ 3 (last modified Mar. 24, 1999) <http://www.edf.org/pubs/EDF-
Letter/1989/Feb/j_market.html>; Harvard Environment and Natural Resources Program, Out-
reach (visited Apr. 1, 1999) <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/BCSIA/ENRP.nsf/web/Outreach>.
36. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-671
(1994)); Bush Breaks Acid Rain Logjam, Commends EDF, 20 EDF LETTER 1, ¶ 3 (last visited
Apr. 11, 1999) <http://www.edf.org/pubs/edf%2Dletter/1989/aug/a%5Facidrain.html>.
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(g)(4) (1994).
38. The emissions trading strategy targets a severe and persistent public health problem.
About 117 million U.S. residents breath unhealthy air during at least parts of the year, due to
levels of ozone, a prime constituent of urban smog, in excess of the new federal health stan-
dard.  See American Lung Association,  Outdoor Air Pollution (last modified Dec. 9, 1998)
<http://www.lungusa.org/air/outdoor_factsheet.html>; American Lung Association, Ozone Air
Pollution (last modified Apr. 18, 1998)  <http://www.lungusa.org/ air/envozone.html>; U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, Regulating Smog and Particulate Air Pollution: An Integrated
Approach (last modified Sep. 11, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/regusmog/infozone.
html> (“In 1995, approximately 70 million U.S. residents were living in counties with ozone
levels that exceed EPA’s [old] ozone standard.”). See generally American Lung Association,
OUT OF BREATH: POPULATIONS-AT-RISK TO ALTERNATIVE OZONE LEVELS (1995).
39. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO
RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS 11 (1993)
(recommending adoption of market-based approaches to reduce pollution); REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOV-
ERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS (visited Apr. 1, 1999)
<http://www.usgs.gov/npr/npr-2/npr-2-4.html>; Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 301, n.2 (describing
support for market-based pollution regulations).
40. See, e.g., Alexandra Teitz, Assessing Point Source Discharge Permit Trading: Case
Study in Controlling Selenium Discharges to the San Francisco Bay Estuary, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q.
79 (1994); David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the Trad-
able Permit Approach From Air Pollution to Habiat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 405
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tors and policy makers are developing pollution trading programs to
address, among other concerns, water pollution41 and global climate
change.42
Thus, the dominant policy viewpoint sees emissions trading as
the strategy for reducing pollution in the 21st  century.  Therefore, it is
critical to find out whether the theoretical predictions and political
promises bear out in practice.  The Los Angeles experience sheds
light on whether emissions trading is a ‘win-win’ cure for environ-
mental ills or a band-aid approach that reduces short-term compli-
ance costs for industry at the expense of public health, social justice
and environmental quality.43
II. LOS ANGELES:  A TEST MARKET FOR
AIR POLLUTION TRADING
The Los Angeles, California, region provides an ideal testing
ground for environmental policies.  Los Angeles’ environmental
problems are severe, its regulatory agencies are sophisticated, its re-
sources are relatively ample, and the region’s population is multi-
racial and economically diverse.  Los Angeles and the State of Cali-
fornia continue to be national and international pacesetters for the
development of new air pollution control policies and technologies.
Thus, the effect of Los Angeles’ pollution trading programs on air
quality, public health, and environmental justice will help inform the
future of this market-based approach.
The South Coast Air Basin,44 which includes the metropolitan
Los Angeles area, suffers the worst air quality in the nation.45  For ex-
                                                                                                                                     
(1996); Fialka, supra note 16 (discussing President Clinton’s plan to expand pollution trading
world-wide and the Environmental Defense Fund’s consulting with British Petroleum on a
world wide carbon dioxide market).
41. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR
WATERSHED-BASED TRADING, EPA 800-R-96-001 (May 1996).
42. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, COM-
BATING  GLOBAL WARMING: POSSIBLE RULES, REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE
ARRANGEMENTS FOR A GLOBAL MARKET IN CO2 EMISSION ENTITLEMENTS (1994); UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
TRADING: DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES, MODALITIES, RULES AND GUIDELINES FOR VERI-
FICATION, REPORTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY (1998).
43. See generally, Driesen, Cheap Fix?, supra note 8 (emissions trading is a cheap fix, not a
free lunch or an enduring solution to pollution problems).
44. The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) was created to
achieve and maintain healthful air quality in the South Coast Air Basin, a four-county region
which includes Los Angeles and Orange counties and parts of Riverside and San Bernardino
counties in California.  This area of 12,000 square miles is home to more than 14 million peo-
ple—almost half the population of the State of California. It is the second most populous urban
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ample, nearly 6,000 premature deaths caused by particulate air pollu-
tion occur in the Los Angeles area each year, representing about a
tenth of such fatalities nationwide.46  Additionally, millions of resi-
dents of the region are exposed to unhealthy levels of ground level
ozone, which causes aching lungs, wheezing, coughing, headache and
permanent lung tissue scarring.47  Levels of toxic chemicals in the air
pose significant risks for causing cancer and other chronic diseases.48
                                                                                                                                     
area in the United States.  See South Coast Air Quality Management District, Introducing
AQMD (last modified Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.aqmd.gov/aqmd/intraqmd.html>.
45. See Matthew Polesetsky, Will a Market in Air Pollution Clean the Nation’s Dirtiest Air?
A Study of the South Coast Air Quality Management District’s Regional Clean Air Market, 22
ECOLOGY L.Q. 359, 362, n.9 (1995) (noting that the South Coast Air Basin has the worst ozone
and nitrogen oxide levels in the country); The Alliance of Small Emitters/Metal Indus. v. South
Coast Air Quality Management Dist., 70 Cal. Rptr. 54, 55 (Cal. App. 2d 1997) (According to
the federal government the greater Los Angeles basin has the most polluted air in the entire
nation, indeed the only area rated as experiencing ‘extreme air pollution.’); Marla Cone, 9
AQMD Advisors Quit in Protest of New Smog Plan Health: Scientists, Economists Express
Concern that Agency’s Policies will not Ensure Healthful Air. They also Fault the District as Lax
in Enforcing Penalties, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996, at A1 (noting that despite decades of prog-
ress, the South Coast Air Basin has the nation’s “foulest air” and violates federal health stan-
dards for ozone on the average of every three days).
46. See DEBORAH S. SHPRENTZ, BREATHTAKING: PREMATURE MORTALITY DUE TO
PARTICULATE AIR POLLUTION IN 239 AMERICAN CITIES 58-73 (1996).  Every year, some
64,000 people in the U.S. die prematurely from cardiopulmonary causes linked to particulate
air pollution, their lives shortened by an average of one to two years.  Los Angeles tops the list
in premature deaths with 5,873 per year.  In comparison, only 1,458 people died from car acci-
dents in Los Angeles in a comparable year, making tailpipe emissions at least as deadly as the
car itself.  Los Angeles’ air pollution early death rate is followed by New York (4,024), Chicago
(3,479) Philadelphia (2,599) and Detroit (2,123). See Deborah S. Sphrentz, Breath-Taking:
Premature Mortality Due to Particulate Air Pollution in 239 American Cities (last modified Mar.
10, 1999) <http://www.nrdc.org/nrdcpro/bt/tableGu.html>; Natural Resource Defense Council,
Danger in the Air (last modified Dec. 16, 1998) <http://www.nrdc.org/find/aibresum.html>;
Marla Cone, Grit in L.A. Blamed in 6,000 L.A. Deaths Yearly, L.A. TIMES, May 9, 1996, at A1.
47.  See South Coast Air Quality Management District, Smog and Health (last modified
Mar. 19, 1997) <http://www.aqmd.gov/smog/inhealth.html> [hereinafter SCAQMD, Smog and
Health].  A 1989 study funded by AQMD and conducted by Dr. Jane Hall of Cal State Fuller-
ton found that ninety-eight percent of the four-county basin’s population of 13 million is ex-
posed to unhealthful air, with children especially vulnerable. In addition, 1,600 people die pre-
maturely each year as a result of exposure to air pollution, according to the study. Millions of
residents of the South Coast Basin breathe dirty air some one-third the days of the year. Ozone
levels here are often twice the federal health standard. See id.
In 1995, the standard was exceeded on 98 days at one or more Basin locations, most fre-
quently in the east San Gabriel Valley. Lungs are ozone’s primary target. Studies on animals
show that ozone damages cells in the lung’s airways, causing inflammation and swelling. It also
reduces the respiratory system’s ability to fight infection and remove foreign particles. Ozone
may pose a particular health threat to the 1.4 million residents who already suffer from respira-
tory problems such as asthma, emphysema and chronic bronchitis. Ozone may also pose a
health threat to the young, elderly and cardiovascular patients. See id.
48. Lisa Getter, Cancer Risk From Air Pollution Still High, Study Says; Environment:
Samples in L.A. Area Indicate Hazard is 426 Times More than Level Set by EPA in 1990. Re-
port is the First to Measure Carcinogenic Dangers of Breathing, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1999, at A1.
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This dangerous mix of air pollutants, which are emitted by multitudes
of factories, cars, and other sources, seriously threatens public health
and well being.
A richly diverse, multi-racial and multi-ethnic population lives,
works, and plays in the Los Angeles region,49 raising the environ-
mental justice50 concern that people of color51 and poor people are un-
fairly exposed to more air pollution than others.52  Therefore, air
pollution reduction strategies, including pollution trading programs,
should be evaluated not only for their efficacy in reducing air pollu-
tion, but also for their effect on achieving environmental justice.  Will
such programs alleviate or worsen the environmental injustice of dis-
proportionate exposures to air pollution already faced by the most
powerless segments of society?53  The answer to this question is al-
49. Of the more than 9.6 million people who live in Los Angeles County, nearly four mil-
lion are Latino, about 3.5 million are White, 1.1 million are Asian/Pacific Islander and about
one million are African-American. See Los Angeles County, County of Los Angeles Statistical
Data (last modified May 12, 1998) <http://www.co.la.ca.us/statistics.htm>.
50. “Environmental justice” describes the goal of remedying the disproportionate burden
of environmental pollution and resource degradation experienced by racial and ethnic minori-
ties and poor people.  A related term ‘environmental racism’ has been used to describe the dis-
parate environmental risks borne by racial minorities.  Another related but broader term,
‘environmental equity’, implies that environmental benefits and risks should be borne equally
by all segments of society. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Justice
(last modified Dec. 3, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/index.html> (EPA defines envi-
ronmental justice as the “fair treatment for people of all races, cultures, and incomes, regarding
the development of environmental laws, regulations, and policies”); Marianne Lavelle & Mar-
cia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Environmental Law, A Special Investiga-
tion, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S1; Roberto Suro, Pollution-Weary Minorities Try Civil
Rights Tack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at A1. See generally CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM: VOICES FROM THE GRASSROOTS (Robert D. Bullard ed. 1993); U.S. ENVIRON-
MENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, “ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY” REDUCING RISK FOR ALL
COMMUNITIES (1992).
51. The term “people of color” refers to racial and ethnic minorities (other than of Euro-
pean descent) in the aggregate, including Latinos, African-Americans, Asian-Pacific Islanders,
Native Americans and other “non-Whites”.  The term “minority” has lost relevance, since in
Los Angeles minorities taken together are in the majority. See Los Angeles County, supra note
49.  The population of the entire State of California has recently become “majority minority”,
with the makeup of the U.S. population expected to follow the same trend.
52. See Kristina Lindgren, Smog Affects Poor, Young, Nonwhite the Most; Research: Air
pollution tends to be worst in low-income area of Southern California, economists claim. Youth
suffer playing outdoors, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at B8.
53. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (on the experience in Los Angeles) and Part III.B (on
the broader policy implications).  The environmental justice question frames the central analy-
sis in this article because until recently few claims had been made as to whether pollution
trading programs affect environmental justice.  As an unresolved concern, the environmental
justice impacts of pollution trading demand close scrutiny.  Also, since trading advocates assert
that equivalent reductions in air pollution will be provided through pollution trading compared
to technology-based regulations, we examine this claim in depth.
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ready of pressing importance in Los Angeles and will become in-
creasingly relevant throughout the rest of the country.  The experi-
ence in Los Angeles provides a relevant model for evaluating the
strengths and weaknesses of pollution trading as a strategy for re-
ducing air pollution and achieving environmental justice, because of
the confluence of severe pollution with a large multicultural popula-
tion.
A.  Pollution Trading Comes of Age in Los Angeles: From Rule 1610
to RECLAIM and Beyond
The development of pollution trading represents an important
modern day chapter in the fifty-year-old political history of air pollu-
tion regulation and reaction in Los Angeles.54  Industry and business
interests in the Los Angeles area, which have generally opposed or
resisted technology-based regulations, reacted strongly against the
court-ordered 1989 Air Quality Management Plan (AQMP).55  Under
intense political pressure compounded by an economic recession, the
South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) openly
embraced industry’s call to replace existing and proposed air quality
regulations with market incentive programs.  The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 199056 authorized states and local air districts to de-
velop economic incentives programs, further paving the way for pol-
54. See South Coast Air Quality Management District, The Southland’s War on Smog:
Fifty Years of Progress Toward Clean Air, Part 1 (last modified Mar. 4, 1997)
<http://www.aqmd.gov/monthly/marchcov.html>.  Oil companies and the Chamber of Com-
merce mounted stiff opposition to air quality regulations as early as 1947 when they opposed
the repeal of a state law giving manufacturers the right to “necessary” discharge of smoke and
fumes, and the creation of an air pollution permit system. See id.
55.  See Steve Padilla, Coalition Sees High Costs, Lost Jobs in AQMD Clean Air Plan, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 1990, at B1 (the air quality plan includes 120 rules which, among other things,
restrict the use of certain chemicals or mandate extra pollution controls on manufacturing).  See
generally Daniel P. Selmi, Transforming Economic Incentives From Theory to Reality: The
Marketable Permit Program of the South Coast Air Quality Management District, 24 ENVTL. L.
RPTR. 10,695 (1994); SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT & SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS, AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT PLAN: SOUTH
COAST AIR BASIN (1989).
This visionary plan identified the need for a virtual phase-out in the use and combustion of
petrochemical-based fuels and products in order to meet health standards for pollutants in
smog.  It divided proposed air pollution control measures into three tiers: Tier I were already
available technologies, Tier II measures were technologies and management strategies ex-
pected to be ready for implementation in the next 10 to 15 years and Tier III measures were
based on conceptual technologies not yet developed. See generally Selmi, supra; SOUTH COAST
AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT & SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF
GOVERNMENTS, supra.
56. Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-671).
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lution trading in Los Angeles.  Emboldened by national policy devel-
opments, an industry coalition called the Regulatory Flexibility
Group successfully lobbied the SCAQMD to amend the Air Quality
Management Plan to suspend industrial air quality regulations while
the details of the market incentives program were developed.57
Following a pattern shaped by the policy agenda of the largest
industrial polluters, a group of market-based regulations centered on
pollution trading have been adopted for the South Coast Air Basin.
In 1993, SCAQMD approved the first old vehicle pollution trading
program in the country, known as Rule 1610 or the “car scrapping
program”.58  Rule 1610 allows stationary source polluters (such as fac-
tories and refineries) to avoid installing expensive pollution control
equipment if they purchase pollution credits generated by destroying
old, high-polluting cars.  Ideally, an equal or greater amount of pollu-
tion can be reduced at a much lower cost by purchasing and destroy-
ing old cars than by forcing stationary sources to install expensive
pollution control equipment.59
57. See Judy Pasternak, AQMD Approves Changes to Region’s Clean Air Plan; Pollution:
Revision is criticized by environmentalists and small businesses and praised by trade associa-
tions, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1991, at A1; Polesetsky, supra note 45, at 362-65 (noting that the
RFG included at various times Chevron, Unocal, Shell, Mobil, Texaco, ARCO, and several of
the other largest polluters); Marla Cone, AQMD Plan for Blue Skies Turns Hazy, L.A. Times,
Aug. 21, 1993, at B1 (reporting that the largest polluters—oil refineries, power utilities, and
major aerospace firms—stand to gain from RECLAIM because they can save millions of dol-
lars a year but that smaller, less-polluting businesses would lose money under RECLAIM).
58. As SCAQMD Executive Officer James Lents wrote to the SCAQMD Board of Direc-
tors:
[Rule 1610] provides an alternative strategy for reducing emissions at a potentially
lower cost . . . [and] adverse impacts on compliance costs for regulated industries will
not occur.  Businesses affected by District stationary source regulations have shown
increasing interest in having the option of implementing mobile source emission con-
trol strategies to acquire emissions reduction credits.  Proposed Rule 1610 addresses
this interest.
Letter from James Lents, Executive Officer, SCAQMD, to SCAQMD Board of Directors to
the SCAQMD Board (Dec. 28, 1992) (urging certification of the Environmental Assessment
for Rule 1610 and adoption of Rule 1610) (on file with author); see also Maria L. La Ganga,
Firms Can Earn Pollution Credits by Buying Old Cars; Environment: AQMD approves ground-
breaking plan to let companies delay costly smog-reduction efforts, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1993, at
A1.
59. See Goldschein, supra note 13, at 254-55.  Though each individual vehicle represents a
miniscule portion of the pollution problem, mobile sources collectively represent a significant
portion.  See id. at 239.  Furthermore, a small number of vehicles account for a disproportionate
amount of motor vehicle emissions.  See id. at 241.  The vast majority of these dirty vehicles are
older vehicles.  See id.  Because of minimal or nonexistant emission control equipment, deterio-
ration, and poor maintenance, older vehicles can generate  very high emission levels.  See id.
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Under Rule 1610, “licensed car scrappers” can purchase and de-
stroy old cars.60  SCAQMD then grants the scrapper emissions credits
based on the projected emissions of the car had it not been destroyed,
which may then be sold to stationary source polluters (e.g. factories).
The stationary sources use the pollution credits to avoid on-site emis-
sion reductions that would be required under the technology-based
regulatory regime.  Rule 1610 requires polluters to purchase credits
representing twenty percent more emission reductions than would be
achieved through compliance with technology-based regulations for
their plant.  Although industrial plants avoid emission reductions, the
scrapping of older, high polluting cars should result in greater air
quality improvements at a lower cost than regulatory mandates.
SCAQMD then adopted the centerpiece of its pollution trading
strategy, the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM),
the world’s first urban smog trading program.61  RECLAIM replaced
many of SCAQMD’s technology-based regulations aimed at reducing
emissions of sulfur oxides (SOx) and nitrogen oxides (NOx).
RECLAIM, a “declining cap and trade” program, mandates annual
emission reductions for industry but provides them the flexibility to
achieve that goal by either purchasing emission reduction credits or
by reducing their own pollution.  Under RECLAIM, SCAQMD allo-
cates pollution credits to each major source facility62 in the region
60. South Coast Air Quality Management District, Regulation XVI - Mobile Source Offset
Programs, Rule 1610(b)(6) (last modified Mar. 11, 1999) <http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/html/tofc
16.html> [hereinafter SCAQMD, Offset Programs]. Rule 1610 represents a form of open mar-
ket trading.  It does not set an overall cap on emissions which declines each year.  Nor does it
mandate participation in trading from a tightly restricted universe of participants.  Instead, any
industry subject to a technology-based regulation listed in Rule 1610 can voluntarily choose to
purchase car scrapping credits in lieu of compliance with the industry rules.
61. See Marla Cone, Smog Market to Offer Pollution by the Pound; Environment:
RECLAIM, the world’s first free-enterprise program to clean up urban air, will make its debut
Jan. 1 with the participation of nearly 400 businesses, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1993, at B1; Selmi,
supra note 55, at 10,695-711 (1994) (detailing the development of the RECLAIM program
leading up to its final adoption).  Originally, RECLAIM was proposed to include trading in
volatile organic compounds (VOCs), but that idea was dropped because of practical difficulties
with VOC monitoring and enforcement and concern about localized increases in toxic VOC
emissions.  See discussion infra Part II.B.2 and Part III.C.4.
62. The RECLAIM market includes all facilities that emit more than four tons of NOx or
SOx per year, except certain exempt public service facilities. See South Coast Air Quality Man-
agement District, Regulation XX - Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM), Rule
2001(b) (last modified Apr. 15, 1998) <http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/html/tofc20.html>
[hereinafter SCAQMD, RECLAIM Rules].  About 400 industrial facilities are included in the
trading universe, representing about two-thirds of the NOx, and eighty-five percent of the SOx,
emissions from permitted stationary source facilities in the Basin.  See Selmi, supra note 55, at
10,698.
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based on its historic level of emissions. Each facility has three op-
tions: 1) it can use all of its credits and pollute up to the level they
allow; 2) it can reduce its pollution and sell the excess credits to other
facilities; or 3) it can increase emissions relative to its initial endow-
ment of credits by buying credits from other facilities.  Each year
SCAQMD decreases the number of credits allocated by the program,
forcing facilities either to decrease their pollution or purchase credits
from other facilities.63  As the number of available credits decreases,
their market price should rise, increasing the market incentive for
companies to reduce pollution rather than purchase credits.  Ac-
cording to its supporters, by 2003 RECLAIM should spur the lowest
cost pollution reduction among individual industrial plants and slash
aggregate emissions of NOx by seventy-five percent and SOx by sixty
percent.64
Toward fulfilling industry’s goal of indefinitely avoiding emis-
sions reductions at their own plants, SCAQMD aggressively ex-
panded its emissions trading strategy.65  In April 1997, the SCAQMD
Governing Board voted to approve Rule 2506, Area Source Credits
(ASCs), which provides for the issuance of marketable credits to en-
tities that voluntarily reduce emissions NOx and SOx.
66 The resulting
ASCs can then be converted to RECLAIM Trading Credits or used
as an alternative method of compliance with other SCAQMD regula-
tions.67  The mobile source pollution trading has expanded beyond
63. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM Rules, supra note 62, at Rule 2002(e)(1).
64. See Cone, supra note 61, at B1.
65. For example, the SCAQMD Annual Report for 1996 states,
in 1996 [SCAQMD] continued its efforts to increase flexibility, streamline require-
ments and reduce fees for businesses under [its] Regulatory Reform Initiatives.  For
example, [SCAQMD] adopted a novel and widely heralded measure to allow busi-
nesses to help meet their air pollution reduction requirements by scrapping old lawn
and gardening equipment, rather than employing costly new controls at their facilities.
South Coast Air Quality Management District, South Coast Air Quality Management District
1996 Annual Report (last modified March 10, 1997) <http://www.aqmd.gov/pubinfo/
96annual.html>.
66. See South Coast Air Quality Management District, Regulation XXV - Intercredit
Trading, Rule 2506 (last modified Dec. 23, 1997) <http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/html/tofc25.
html> [hereinafter SCAQMD, Intercredit Trading]; South Coast Air Quality Management Dis-
trict, Board Meeting Date: April 11, 1997 Agenda No. 37, Adopt Proposed Rule 2506—Area
Source Credits (last modified Apr. 10, 1997) <http://www.aqmd.gov/hb/970437a.html>.  Inter-
estingly, Rule 2506 specifically states that “[u]se of ASC’s pursuant to any other District rule or
regulation prior to approval by EPA into the SIP of such rule or regulation may be subject to
enforcement action pursuant to the federal Clean Air Act.” SCAQMD, Intercredit Trading, at
Rule 2506(k)(2).
67. See SCAQMD, Intercredit Trading, supra note 66, at Rule 2506(a), Rule 2506(k)(1).
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Rule 1610 to provide for the issuance of Mobile Source Emission Re-
duction Credits (MSERCs) for voluntary emission reductions from:
• the repair of emissions-related components in high-emitting
vehicles,68
• the purchase of clean on-road vehicles, including new, low-
emission buses, retrofitting vehicles to low-emission configu-
rations, and purchasing zero-emission vehicles,69
• the electrification of truck stops and tour bus stops to pre-
vent engine idling,70
• the purchase of low or zero emission off-road vehicles,71
• the purchase of clean lawn and garden equipment, such as
battery-operated lawn mowers and leaf blowers, and the
scrapping  of old equipment.72
Additionally, SCAQMD has proposed a broad Intercredit
Trading Program that will radically expand the emissions trading
market by linking all of SCAQMD’s stationary, mobile, and area
source credit markets.73  To avoid reducing emissions from their em-
ployees’ commutes, the Air Quality Investment Program allows large
employers and other polluters to pay a fee to be used later to reduce
other emissions.74  Final adoption in 1999 of the Intercredit Trading
rule, the lynchpin of the Intercredit Trading program, is expected to
address the critical issues of credit conversion between markets,
credit life, and banking.75 With industry encouragement, SCAQMD
68. See SCAQMD, Offset Programs, supra note 60, at Rule 1605.
69. See id. at Rule 1612.
70. See id. at Rule 1613.
71. See id. at Rule 1620.
72. See id. at Rule 1623. See also Marla Cone, Lawn Mower Buyback Plan Approved;
Smog: Policy will let firms purchase and scrap homeowners’ gas-powered equipment in exchange
for pollution credits, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 1996, at A20.
73. See Bill Kelly, Intercredit Trading Market Proposed, 3 AQMD ADVISOR 4, 4-5 (March
1996); Howard Fine, AQMD Banking on Broader Smog Credit Plan, ORANGE CO. BUS. J.,
Feb. 12, 1996, at 3 (noting that the intercredit trading program would not result in any addi-
tional emissions reductions, but rather make it easier for companies to reduce emissions under
existing rules).
74. See SCAQMD, Intercredit Trading, supra note 66, at Rule 2501; South Coast Air
Quality Management District, AQMD News - AQMD Approves Air Quality Investment Pro-
gram, (last modified Feb. 23, 1999) <http://www.aqmd.gov/news1/Archives/aqip1.html>
[hereinafter SCAQMD, Air Quality Investment Program].
75. See South Coast Air Quality Management District, Board Meeting Date: March 14,
1997 Agenda No. 2, Set Public Hearing April 11, 1997 to Adopt Proposed Rule 2501—Air
Quality Investment Program (last modified Mar. 10, 1997) <http://www.aqmd.gov/
hb/97032a.html>; South Coast Air Quality Management District, Board Meeting Date: Febru-
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has demonstrated a firm commitment to the emissions trading strat-
egy and has expanded its use in a variety of areas.
As SCAQMD has increased use of the trading approach, the Los
Angeles experiments with pollution trading have become test cases
for federal pollution trading policy concerning urban smog.  EPA has
looked to the model programs in Los Angeles to determine the ad-
vantages and drawbacks of emissions trading strategies.  EPA’s pol-
icy guidance on Economic Incentive Programs (EIPs)76 establishes
the rules for programs similar to RECLAIM to be developed around
the country.77  In 1995, EPA issued a model Open Market Trading
Rule to enable states and regions to develop inter-credit trading pro-
grams similar to those now under development in Los Angeles.78
Open market trading would allow credits earned from reducing emis-
sions from mobile, stationary and area sources79 to be used by indus-
trial polluters to forego their existing emissions reduction obligations.
However, concerns raised about toxic hot-spots and environmental
justice,80 and the efficacy of the Los Angeles trading programs81 have
given pause to EPA’s plans to grant the necessary approval for new
emissions trading programs. Based on the Los Angeles experience,
EPA hopes to develop safeguards and adopt amendments to its EIP
program guidance and rules to mitigate or prevent environmental
justice impacts.82
The Los Angeles experiments are having a significant impact on
the national policy debate on air pollution trading.  Therefore, the re-
                                                                                                                                     
ary 12, 1999 Agenda No. 18, Rule and Control Measure Forecast (last modified Feb. 9, 1999)
<http://www.aqmd.gov/hb/990218a.html>.
76. Recall that the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments authorized states and regions to de-
velop EIPs as central policy strategies for reducing urban smog.  See discussion supra Part I.B.
77. See Economic Incentive Program Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 16,609, 16,710 (1994).
78. See Open Market Trading Rule for Ozone Smog Precursors, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,668
(1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Ch. 1) (proposed Aug. 3, 1995); Open Market Trading Rule
for Ozone Smog Precursors, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,290 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Ch. 1)
(proposed Aug. 25, 1995).  Due to concerns raised by environmentalists, the Open Market
Trading Rule was never approved as a final federal regulation by EPA, but serves instead as
guidance to the states and regional districts.
79. Air pollution sources fall into three categories.  “Mobile sources” include autos, trucks
and other transportation related activities.  “Stationary sources” include factories, power plants
and other discrete, fixed facilities.  “Area sources” include all other air pollution emitted by
many diverse small sources, such as from the use of consumer products like paints, barbecue
grills, and from small stationary sources.
80. See discussion infra Part II.B.1 and Part III.B.
81. See discussion infra Part II.B.2-3 and Part III.C.
82. See Robert Perciaseppe, Address at Joint Meeting of the Enforcement Subcommittee
and Air & Water Subcommittee of the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (Dec.
9, 1998)  (on file with authors).
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sults of the car scrapping and RECLAIM trading programs must be
carefully evaluated.  In order for emissions trading to live up to its
proponents’ claims, it must clean the air at least as well as the tech-
nology-based approach without adverse side effects.  However, the
Los Angeles experiments in pollution trading have created additional
adverse public health impacts, such as toxic hot-spots, and have re-
sulted in environmental injustice.  To make matters worse, the pollu-
tion trading programs in L.A produced even fewer emission reduc-
tions than technology-based regulations.
B. The Harsh Reality: Problems with Pollution Trading in Los
Angeles
Evidence indicates that pollution trading programs in Los An-
geles are plagued with problems.  Although the programs have suc-
ceeded in saving money for industry, they have not effectively re-
duced emissions and have not promoted technology innovation or
public participation.  Instead, they have further concentrated the re-
gion’s pollution in lower income communities and given industry a
“free ride” from otherwise obligatory emissions reduction schedules.
1.  Toxic Hot-spots and Environmental Injustice: The Mad
Science of Pollution Trading
Pollution trading programs can unfairly concentrate pollution in
communities where factories purchase emissions reduction credits
rather than reduce actual emissions.  These localized health risks
from pollution sources, or “toxic hot-spots,” tend to be overlooked
by policy makers focused on regional air quality concerns.  However,
the disproportionate burden thrust on communities surrounding ma-
jor pollution emitters takes its toll in the form of increased risks of
toxic exposure and damage to human health.  Furthermore, it is envi-
ronmentally unjust when these communities  enduring localized toxic
hot-spots are overwhelmingly low income and populated by people of
color.83  Such hot-spots can be worsened when pollution trading pro-
grams ignore the differences in chemical hazards posed by the pollut-
ants reduced to earn credits and the pollutants emitted through the
purchase of credits. The problem of hot-spots is further complicated
by the emission of co-pollutants and precursors, which may increase
exposure to certain types of chemicals in downwind communities
where pollution is concentrated.
83. See Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) (federal policy requires that en-
vironmental injustice be assessed and addressed).  See discussion infra Part III.B.
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SCAQMD’s pollution trading programs have resulted in the
creation of toxic hot-spots by concentrating pollution in communities
surrounding major sources of pollution.  Rule 1610 provides the
clearest example.  SCAQMD studies indicate that cars destroyed
through the Rule 1610 program were registered throughout the air
quality management district, a four-county region.84 Air pollution
from these automobiles would have also been distributed throughout
this region.  By contrast, stationary sources in Los Angeles are
densely clustered in only a few communities in this four-county re-
gion.85  As a result of these distribution patterns, Rule 1610 effec-
tively takes pollution formerly distributed throughout the region by
automobiles, and concentrates that pollution in the communities sur-
rounding stationary sources.
Most of the emissions credits purchased to avoid stationary
source controls have been purchased by four oil companies: Unocal,
Chevron, Ultramar and GATX.86  Of these four companies, three are
located close together in the communities of Wilmington and San
Pedro; the fourth facility, Chevron, is located nearby in El Segundo.
These companies have used pollution credits to avoid installing pollu-
tion control equipment87 that captures toxic gases released during oil
tanker loading at their marine terminals.88  When loading oil tankers,
toxic gases are forced out of the tanker and into the air, exposing
workers and nearby residents to toxic vapors, including benzene, a
84. See Declaration of Bruce Lohmann in Support of Complainants Opposition to Re-
spondents’ Response to Environmental Justice Complaint at 22, Communities for a Better En-
vironment v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., EPA File No.10 R-97-R9 (US EPA,
Office of Civil Rights 1998) (“[T]he cars that were scrapped came from all over the South
Coast Air Basin, a four-county area.”) [hereinafter Lohmann Declaration]; South Coast Air
Quality Management District, Rule 1610/All Vehicles Scrapped (undated map) (on file with
authors).
85. See discussion infra, Part IV.A.
86. See generally Letter from Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., Communities for a Better
Environment, to Anne Goode, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Nov. 23, 1998) (Re:
CBE et al. v. SCAQMD et al., No. 10R-97-R9; CBE’s response to SCAQMD’s June 26, 1998
Brief in the Title VI Civil Rights Act complaint filed against the SCAQMD over the car scrap-
ping program) (on file with authors).
87. The equipment is similar to the vapor control nozzles common at gasoline stations in
many states, only much larger.
88. Vapor recovery during marine loading was required by SCAQMD, Rule 1142, which
EPA approved for inclusion in the State Implementation Plan, making the requirement en-
forceable under the federal Clean Air Act. See Approval and Promulgation of Implementation
Plans; California State Implementation Plan Revision; San Diego County Air Pollution Control
District; San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District; South Coast Air Quality
Management District, 59 Fed. Reg. 64,132 (1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 52) (proposed
Dec. 13, 1994).
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known human carcinogen.89  Thus, by using pollution credits, these
companies are allowed to avoid reducing local emissions of hazard-
ous chemicals in exchange for reducing regional auto emissions.  As a
result of Rule 1610, the four oil companies created a toxic chemical
hot-spot around their marine terminals, exposing workers and nearby
residents to elevated health risks.
Exposure to the emissions from loading marine vessels poses a
cancer risk greater than 150 in 1 million for the maximum exposed
individual.90  By comparison, the typical significant risk threshold for
cancer risk ranges from one to one hundred in 1 million.91  Neither of
these risk estimates considers the cumulative impact of marine ter-
minal emissions in combination with all the other sources of toxic air
contaminants to which people in the region are exposed.92
Rule 1610 allows automobile pollution, which was formerly dis-
tributed widely across the four-county South Coast Air Basin, to be
traded for highly concentrated “volatile organic compounds” (VOCs)
that are released into the communities surrounding these marine
terminals.  In theory, air pollution was reduced by a slight amount
throughout the Los Angeles region to offset this pollution hot-spot.
However, now a few communities surrounding stationary sources
bear the brunt of pollution exposures that were formerly shared by
the entire region’s population.93
89. See Shipra Bansal & Scott Kuhn, Stopping an Unfair Trade: Environmental Justice,
Pollution Trading, and Cumulative Impacts in Los Angeles, ENVTL. L. NEWS, Spring 1998, at
16, 17-18.  A marine vapor recovery system can reduce VOC emissions by at least ninety-five
percent during any loading, lightering, ballasting or housekeeping events.  See id. at 20.
90. See Los Angeles County Building and Construction Trades Council and the Steamfit-
ters and Pipefitters Local 250, Comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Report for the
Renewal of Unocal’s Lease for Berths 148-151, in FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT
FOR BERTHS 148-151 PORT OF LOS ANGELES 17, 23 (1996).  The Environmental Impact Re-
port documented that workers at the marine terminal would be exposed to a total cancer risk of
162 in a million if that facility’s lease was renewed to allow four additional ships per month to
unload.
91. The Clean Air Act establishes that if technology-based standards do not reduce life-
time excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to hazardous air emissions to less than
one in one million, the EPA Administrator shall promulgate standards under this subsection
for such source category, in order to protect human health and the environment.  See 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(f)(2)(A) (1994).  The same risk level forms the basis for delisting hazardous air pollut-
ants providing that the cancer risks from sources is less than one on a million.   See 42 U.S.C. §
7412(c)(9)(b)(i) (1994).
92. The average “background” cancer risk from exposure to toxic chemicals in the air of
Los Angeles is 426 in one million.  See Getter, supra note 48, at A1.
93. Similar trading patterns have developed under RECLAIM.  The region’s largest pol-
luters, particularly refineries, have been the most active purchasers of RECLAIM emission
reduction credits.  See Douglas Young, Unocal Stocking up on Pollution Credit as Refinery Sell-
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To add insult to injury, the public health risks from the extra
pollution concentrated in these neighborhoods constitutes a case of
environmental injustice.  The demographics of this hot-spot area
starkly contrast with that of the metropolitan Los Angeles region.
The residents living in San Pedro and Wilmington, which host a ma-
jority of the oil companies emitting hazardous toxic chemicals, are
overwhelmingly Latino.  Furthermore, the racial composition of
communities living near three of the marine terminals ranges from 75
to 90 percent people of color, while the entire South Coast Air Basin
has a population of only 36 percent people of color.94
These communities are already overburdened with high levels of
pollution.95  People of color bear a disproportionate share of the im-
pacts of air pollution and other environmental hazards within the Ba-
sin.96 A 1993 SCAQMD study found that “those who are relatively
                                                                                                                                     
off Nears,  L.A. Bus. J., Mar. 17, 1997, at 13 (noting that Unocal and Chevron were the top two
purchasers of pollution credits in 1996. Three other refineries were among the top 10 purchas-
ers: Mobil, Texaco, and Powerine Oil Company).
94. See Bansal & Kuhn, supra note 89, at 18.  The South Coast Air Basin is home to
13,862,513 people. Of this number, 4,988,739 are people of color and 8,873,774 are white. See
U.S. Census Bureau, Census Bureau Population topics and Household Economic Topics
(visited Apr. 1, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/population/www/index.html>.  Los Angeles
County has a population of 8,863,164, and 43.1 percent are people of color. See Los Angeles
County, supra note 49.  The population demographics around the marine terminals were de-
termined using EPA’s Landview software program. See U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, LandView III Mapping Tool (last modified June 8, 1998)
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/lvinfo.htm> (LandView III uses U.S. census data to deter-
mine population demographics around selected facilities).
95. A review of the 1994 Toxic Release Inventory data reveals that 1,964,445 pounds of air
pollution and 198,956 pounds of water pollution was released from facilities in the Wilmington-
San Pedro area. See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT/CALIFORNIA
STATE UNIVERSITY FULLERTON FOUNDATION, THE DISTRIBUTION OF CURRENT AND
FUTURE EXPOSURE TO OZONE, FINE PARTICULATE MATTER, CARBON MONOXIDE, AND
NITROGEN DIOXIDE AMONG DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS IN THE SOUTH COAST AIR BASIN,
FINAL REPORT 5 (April 1993); ERIC MANN, L.A.’S LETHAL AIR: NEW STRATEGIES FOR
POLICY, ORGANIZING, AND ACTION 27-34 (1991) (noting that four of the country’s top twenty
air polluters are located in the Wilmington and San Pedro areas).
96. See SCAQMD, Smog and Health, supra note 47.  In 1991, a study by Dr. Jane Hall of
Cal State Fullerton showed that minorities as a whole were exposed more often to poor air
quality since affordable housing is located where the air is more polluted.  African-Americans
and Hispanics generally breathe the worst air, partly because they tend to work in outdoor oc-
cupations.  See MANN, supra note 95, at 31 (asserting that in Los Angeles, seventy-one percent
of African Americans and fifty percent of Latinos live in the areas with the worst air quality);
Susan Moffat, Minorities Found More Likely to Live Near Toxic Sites, L.A. Times, Aug. 30,
1995, at B1 (people of color in Los Angeles County are three times more likely than whites to
live within half a mile of hazardous waste treatment or dumping centers); Eric Mann, L.A.’s
Smogbusters: Pollution in Los Angeles, THE NATION, Sept. 17, 1990, at 257, 268 (1990) (noting
that the Latino and Black communities in East Los Angeles, Huntington Park, and Watts are
disproportionately impacted by industrial facilities and pollution).  See also Lindgren, supra
note 52, at B8.
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poorer or younger, black or Latino, are exposed to more pollution
than those who are better off, older, and white or Asian.”97  A 1993
study of the distribution of toxic chemical releases from manufactur-
ing facilities in Los Angeles County98 found that the majority of facili-
ties emitting toxic pollutants were in “Hispanic-dominated” census
tracts.99  A 1996 study found that, given two neighborhoods of equal
economic standing and with equal percentages of industrial activity,
the community inhabited by a greater number of minorities will be
more likely to have a hazardous waste treatment, storage, and dis-
posal facility (TSDF) in their midst.100  Overall, minorities are more
than twice as likely as Caucasians to be living in a census tract located
within a one-mile radius of at least one large capacity TSDF in Los
Angeles County.101  Although environmental injustice seems to be
one endemic feature of environmental programs in the Los Angeles
area, pollution trading worsens the problem.
The hazards of trading extend beyond the shifting of pollution
from a dispersed region to more concentrated localized areas; inter-
pollutant trading can also create toxic hot-spots.102  Many trading pro-
grams allow facilities to trade pollution credits generated through re-
ductions in a large variety of chemicals.  For example, the Rule 1610
program allows pollution credits to be generated through reductions
in VOCs.103  VOCs are a family of over 600 chemical compounds,104
some of which have high toxicity and some of which have low toxic-
ity. VOC trading raises concerns about the difference in toxicity of
97. SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT/CALIFORNIA STATE UNI-
VERSITY FULLERTON FOUNDATION, supra note 95, at 5.
98. The study looked at manufacturing facilities required to report environmental releases
of hazardous chemicals under the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) program of the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). See 42 U.S.C. § 11001 (1994).
99. See generally LAURETTA M. BURKE, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY IN LOS ANGELES
(1993) (National Center for Geographic Information and Analysis Technical Report 93-6).
100. See Joel Thomas Boer & Dr. James L. Sadd, In Whose Back Yard?  The Demography
of Populations Proximate to Hazardous Waste Facilities in Los Angeles County, ENVTL L.
NEWS 10, 14 (1996).
101. See id.
102. The term “inter-pollutant trading” refers to the allowing of emissions of one pollutant
to persist or increase in exchange for reducing emissions of a different pollutant somewhere
else.  In the discussion, supra, hot-spots resulted from allowing concentrated emissions in one
location in exchange for widely dispersed emission reductions throughout the region.  Through
inter-pollutant trading, the continued (or increased) emissions of more hazardous pollutants
could be justified by other reductions in less hazardous pollutants.
103. See SCAQMD, Offset Programs, supra note 60, at Rule 1610(a).
104. See Bansal & Kuhn, supra note 89, at 18; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Of-
fice of Air Quality Planning & Standards, Speciation Profiles for Volatile Organic Compounds,
USEPA SPECIATE software.
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VOC emissions from marine terminals compared to VOCs from
automobiles.  For example, benzene levels may be higher in VOC
emissions from marine terminals than from cars,105 which leads to
greater exposure and risks concentrated in the communities around
the marine terminals.  Benzene exposure can cause leukemia, ane-
mia, respiratory tract irritation, dermatitis, pulmonary edema, and
hemorrhaging.106  Therefore, the Rule 1610 program may allow con-
tinued release of highly toxic chemicals into certain communities in
exchange for small area-wide reductions in much less toxic chemicals.
Yet, no source testing has been required by SCAQMD to accurately
characterize the differences in chemical composition and toxicity
among VOC emissions subject to trading.
In addition to concerns about variable toxicity, VOCs also ex-
hibit different degrees of reactivity related to their ability to form
photochemical smog.107  These differences in photochemical reactivity
have long been recognized in air pollution regulation and have
guided priority setting in the control of VOC sources for smog con-
trol.108  In pollution trading programs, however, if highly reactive
105. Using USEPA software called SPECIATE, Communities for a Better Environment’s
staff scientist, Shipra Bansal downloaded the average chemical breakdowns for VOC emissions
at petroleum product storage facilities (a surrogate for marine terminals) and for VOC emis-
sions out of tailpipes.  See Bansal & Kuhn, supra note 89, at 18.  While benzene makes up to
thirty-two percent of fugitive emissions at the marine terminals according to this model, it
makes up less than two percent of tailpipe emissions. See id. at 19.  Emissions from marine ter-
minals have up to 16 times more benzene than automobile air emissions. See id.  No source
testing data are available to verify the content of benzene or other toxic chemicals in the ma-
rine terminal VOC emissions.  The same VOC profiles showed that twenty-two percent of the
emissions by weight from marine terminals consisted of chemicals not found at all in tailpipe
emissions.  See id.
106. Benzene is listed as a “hazardous air pollutant” in the 1990 Clean Air Act and is on
the California Proposition 65 list of cancer-causing chemicals.  See J. HARTE, ET AL., TOXICS
A TO Z 233-35 (1991); Bansal & Kuhn, supra note 89, at 19; SAFE DRINKING WATER AND
TOXIC ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1986 (PROPOSITION 65), CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
25249.8 (West 1998).
107. Volatile organic compounds (VOCs) include reactive organic gases containing carbon
that interact with nitrogen oxides (NOx) in the presence of sunlight to form photochemical
smog, including ground level ozone for which state and federal health standards have been es-
tablished.
108. See Recommended Policy on Control of Volatile Organic Compounds, 42 Fed. Reg.
35,314 (1977); Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation
Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 3941 (1992)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. Parts 51 and 52) (proposed Feb. 3, 1992) (re-defining VOC).  See Air
Quality: Revision to Definition of Volatile Organic Compounds--Exclusion of Acetone, 60 Fed.
Reg. 31,635 (1995) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 51) (proposed June 16, 1995) (citing William P.
L. Carter, Development of Ozone Reactivity Scales for Volatile Organic Compounds, J. AIR &
WAST MGT. ASSOC. (1994). Table III of Carter’s paper gives a list of organic compounds
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VOCs are emitted by purchasing credits earned for reducing low re-
activity VOCs, then downwind ozone (smog) formation may be in-
creased rather than reduced.  This represents another inter-pollutant
trading flaw in pollution trading programs that include VOCs.
The complex chemistry of air pollution leads to further problems
with pollution trading.  Emissions are composed of complex mixtures
of chemicals, not the single pollutants often targeted for regulation or
trading.  We use the term “co-pollutants” to describe the secondary
pollutants that inextricably accompany the emission of primary tar-
geted pollutants.  Further, air pollutants can later undergo chemical
changes into more hazardous pollutants downwind.  The initially
emitted chemicals are commonly referred to as “precursors” to the
hazardous pollutants formed later.109  Since pollution trading enables
polluters to avoid emission reductions, or even increase emissions, at
one location by purchasing credits earned elsewhere, the co-
pollutants associated with that emission source may also persist and
concentrate around that polluter.  Likewise, if emissions contain pre-
cursors, then greater exposure to the pollutants formed later may oc-
cur downwind when credits are purchased to maintain or increase
emissions at a facility.
The results of the Rule 1610 car scrapping program demonstrate
the co-pollutant problem.  The VOCs emitted from the oil refinery
marine terminals were targeted for regulation because they are pre-
cursors to ozone formation.  In fact, many of the VOCs are also toxic
co-pollutants.  Unrestricted trading of VOCs inevitably results in lo-
calized toxic hot-spots, where toxic VOCs exist at higher levels at
some locations than would be allowed under a technology-based
regulatory regime.
The RECLAIM trading program presents a broader and less ex-
amined case of the co-pollutant and precursor problem.  RECLAIM
allows industrial sources to separately trade two combustion byprod-
ucts, NOx and SOx.
110  The trading program and the technology-based
                                                                                                                                     
ranked by a maximum incremental reactivity (MIR) scale, with higher scores for VOCs that are
more likely to react to form ground level ozone in smog.).
109. For example, ground level ozone forms as a result of precursor emissions of NOx and
VOCs from numerous sources in a broad geographic area.  NOx and SOx are precursors to acid
rain formation.  Combustion gases can act as precursors to the formation of fine particles, or
particulate matter, another serious air pollution problem.
110. NOx and SOx are emitted when fossil fuels are burned at a variety of industrial-
commercial-institutional combustion sources and transportation-related sources. Hundreds of
other co-pollutants are released during combustion of fossil fuels including fine particles, poly-
cyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, mercury and other hazardous air pollutants and products of in-
complete combustion. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INDUSTRIAL
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rules it replaced targeted NOx as a precursor to ozone smog forma-
tion.  SOx was included because it is a precursor to the formation of
fine particulate matter, which lodges deep in people’s lungs contrib-
uting to premature mortality and breathing difficulties.111
Does the trading of NOx and SOx, which allows some major
sources to avoid emissions reductions, result in persistent or in-
creased exposures in some areas to hazardous co-pollutants or pre-
cursors to hazardous pollutants, such as fine particles, ozone or for-
maldehyde?  The answer is “maybe.”  There has been little analysis
of whether concentrated hot-spots of ozone or other photochemical
oxidants, e.g. formaldehyde, or increased exposure to fine particu-
lates, have resulted from RECLAIM trading patterns.112  More re-
search needs to be performed in this area, because the co-pollutant
and precursor problems may be exacerbating the already unfair con-
centration of the region’s pollution in a few communities.
2. Market Incentives Run Amok:  Fraud and Manipulation
Air pollution regulatory programs have been plagued with tech-
nical uncertainties in accurately accounting for the amount of emis-
sions from different sources.113  Such concerns exist for both a tech-
nology-based approach and an emissions trading approach to
regulation.  However, for an emissions trading program, accuracy is
more important than for technology-based regulations, because an
accounting of pollution forms the basis for the number of emissions
                                                                                                                                     
COMBUSTION COORDINATED RULEMAKING: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 10
(1997).
111. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,697.
112. See SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT, RECLAIM PROGRAM
THREE-YEAR AUDIT AND PROGRESS REPORT 104-13 (1998) [hereinafter SCAQMD,
RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT]; Scott L. Johnson & David M. Pekelney, Economic assessment
of the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market: a new emissions trading program for Los Angeles,
72 LAND ECONOMICS 277, 292 (1996) (reporting the methodology used to assess the potential
economic and environmental impacts of the RECLAIM emissions trading programs).  Johnson
and Pekelney report that RECLAIM will result in “changes in geographic distribution [which]
include peak ozone concentrations that are lower in the western and central areas of the Basin
and higher in some areas of southern Los Angeles County and northern Orange County, com-
pared to CAC [command-and-control] regulations.”  See id.
113. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Planning and Stan-
dards, Clearinghouse for Inventories and Emissions Factors, COMPILATION OF AIR POL-
LUTANT EMISSIONS FACTORS, AP-42, FIFTH EDITION, VOL. I: STATIONARY POINT AND AREA
SOURCES 3-4 (1995) (last modified July 3, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/ap42pdf/c00s00.
pdf> [hereinafter U.S. EPA, AP-42].  A variety of techniques are available to estimate emis-
sions.  The reliability of these estimates increases with sophistication of method and cost of
methods.  In general, direct source testing and continuous emissions monitoring provide better
representation of a tested source’s emissions than using emission factors or engineering judg-
ment.
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reduction credits required by each facility.  Furthermore, when an
emissions trading approach is employed, the incidence of fraud may
be greater.  Pollution trading programs create stronger incentives to
manipulate the numbers and cheat, because credits that are fraudu-
lently created are still worth money.  The Los Angeles pollution
trading experience with car scrapping has been plagued by a history
of under-reporting of actual emissions from industry and an over-
reporting of claimed emission reductions from cars.
Pollution trading programs primarily rely on industry self-
reporting of emission reductions and increases.  Based on these self-
reports, regulatory agencies must allocate air pollution credits.  In
Los Angeles, widespread under-reporting, inaccurate modeling, and
potential financial windfalls for polluters plague the pollution trading
program.114
In the Rule 1610 program, for example, oil companies purchase
pollution credits from the scrapping of old cars to offset their VOC
emissions.  In order to determine the number of emission reduction
credits that oil companies need to purchase from car scrappers,
SCAQMD relies on industry self-reporting of emissions.  The pro-
gram creates an incentive to under-report actual emissions.  By un-
der-reporting their air pollution, the companies can reduce their pur-
chase of emission reduction credits.
Rather than measure actual emissions released, companies esti-
mate emissions using emission factors developed by the Western
States Petroleum Association.  Emissions factors are surrogate esti-
mates of emissions based on activity level.115  For example, engineers
may estimate that a small industrial boiler will release so many
pounds of NOx for every barrel of fuel oil burned.  Emission factors
are hotly argued among technical specialists from different fields and
change as new information becomes available.  Emissions factors are
poor surrogates for actual measurements.  With margins of error
ranging from fifty percent to one hundred percent, emissions factors
are highly uncertain, making claimed emission reduction difficult to
114. See discussion infra Part III.C.4.  There are inherent problems with monitoring and
enforcement associated with pollution trading.  In Los Angeles, noncompliance rates by indus-
try are high for the pollution monitoring requirements of the RECLAIM trading program.
115. See U.S. EPA, AP-42, supra note 113, at 2.  “Because emission factors essentially rep-
resent an average of a range of emission rates, approximately half of the subject sources will
have emission rates greater than the emission factor and the other half will have emission rates
less than the factor.  As such, a permit limit using an AP-42 emission factor would result in half
of the sources being in noncompliance.”  Id.
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verify.116  They can readily be adjusted to report emissions as being
higher or lower, since at best they represent educated guesses of ac-
tual emissions.117  Source testing, which measures actual emissions,
was required to ensure compliance with the technology-based emis-
sion limits set under Rule 1142 for marine terminals.118
Information recently obtained through the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act reveals that the oil companies did, in fact, measure their
emissions.  When the actual measurements were compared to re-
ported emissions based on industry emissions factors, striking differ-
ences were revealed.  Oil companies under-reported their oil tanker
emissions by factors between 10 and 1000.119  As a result, the oil com-
panies purchased between 10 and 1000 times too few credits from
scrapping old, high-polluting cars to offset their tanker pollution.
This persistent problem was completely overlooked by SCAQMD
and was only detected through a time-consuming investigation by
Communities for a Better Environment.120  However, despite this un-
der-reporting, SCAQMD continues to allow the use of emissions fac-
tors to underestimate emissions.
Exacerbating the huge gap between actual emissions and credits
purchased by polluters, credit generators—the car scrappers—have
abused the system.  Many of the cars allegedly destroyed through the
116. See Letter from Jim Jenal, Richard Toshiyuki Drury & Alan Ramo, Communities for
a Better Environment (CBE), to James M. Lents, Ph.D., Executive Officer, SCAQMD 4 (June
25, 1993) (CBE’S COMMENTS ON DRAFT RECLAIM RULES AND ENVIRONMENTAL AS-
SESSMENT) (on file with authors).   See also Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,705.
117. Cf. Letter from Jim Jenal, Richard Toshiyuki Drury & Alan Ramo to James M. Lents,
supra note 116, at 4.  In the South Coast Air Basin, approximately eighty percent of sources are
in AP-42 categories E and F, meaning that their emissions factors have the lowest level of accu-
racy.  See id. at 4 (citing to EPA’s COMPILATION OF AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FACTORS,
AP-42, (4th ed.)).
118. See Letter from Wang, Mgr., Oper. & Envtl. Issues, Western States Petroleum Asso-
ciation, to Jim Lents, Exec. Officer, SCAQMD 3 (April 27, 1994) (source testing needed to en-
sure compliance with Rule 1142 limits) (on file with authors).
119. See Letter from Richard Toshiyuki Drury et al., to Anne Goode, supra note 86 (citing
UNOCAL, VAPOR SOURCES: PERMIT APPLICATION SECTION 5 (Mar. 25, 1992) which contains
data supporting a permit to install a vapor reduction system at the Wilmington Marine Termi-
nal).  The actual, measured emission rates in Unocal’s Vapor Sources are significantly higher,
from 12 to 1247 times higher, than what Unocal reported to SCAQMD on its Rule 1142/1610
compliance forms.  Adding together all of Unocal’s under-reported and unreported marine
loading emissions from 245 loading events from January 12, 1995 through March 31, 1998, re-
veals that Unocal purchased 3 million fewer pounds worth of Mobile Source Emission Reduc-
tion Credits than required.
120. Communities for a Better Environment (CBE) is a non-governmental organization
that works with people affected by industrial pollution to improve environmental health and
achieve environmental justice.  The authors are current and former employees of CBE.
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Rule 1610 program were not, in fact, destroyed, according to Bruce
Lohmann,  SCAQMD’s Chief Inspector for the Rule 1610 program.121
While the car bodies were crushed, many of the engines which pro-
duce the pollution were not.  Instead, many of those engines were
sold for re-use, despite the fact that pollution credits for destroying
the car had been granted by SCAQMD.122 EPA has refused to ap-
prove the Rule 1610 program precisely because car engines are not
always destroyed.123
Several assumptions underlying the Rule 1610 program are also
dubious.  In order to quantify the credits generated by scrapping a
vehicle, SCAQMD assumes that the old cars would have been driven
approximately 4,000 to 5,000 miles annually for an additional three
years and that the owner of the car would replace it with a “fleet av-
erage” automobile.124  Although these assumptions were based on
studies of old car driving patterns, they have not been borne out in
reality.125
According to Inspector Lohmann and an audit conducted by
SCAQMD, many of the cars scrapped through the Rule 1610 pro-
gram were at the end of their useful life, and would have been de-
stroyed through natural attrition.126  Each year, between 100,000 to
200,000 old vehicles are naturally scrapped or abandoned without the
intervention of the Rule 1610 trading programs.127  No “surplus”
121. See Lohmann Declaration, supra note 84, at 11-12.; Declaration of Bruce Lohmann in
Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 11-12, Communities for a Better
Environment v. Chevron Corp.  (1998) (on file with authors).
122. See Lohmann Declaration, supra note 84, at 11.
123. See Letters from David P. Howekamp, Director, Air Division, EPA Region 9, to Barry
Wallerstein, Acting Executive Officer, SCAQMD (June 23, 1998) (Aug. 12, 1998) (on file with
authors).
124. See Lohmann Declaration, supra note 84, at 2-3; SCAQMD, Offset Programs, supra
note 60, at Rule 1610(i).
125. See Lohmann Declaration, supra note 84, at 2, 21.
126. See id. at 5-6, 10. See also South Coast Air Quality Management District, Board Meet-
ing Date: June 12, 1998 Agenda No. 4 (citing SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT
DISTRICT, ATTACHMENT C: RULE 1610 OLD VEHICLE SCRAPPING SURVEY REPORT (March
1998)) (last modified June 26, 1998) <http://www.aqmd.gov/hb/98064a.html> [hereinafter
SCAQMD, Board Meeting June 12, 1998].
127. Each endpoint in the estimated range of the number of scrapped cars represents an
estimate from a different source, rounded to the nearest 100,000.  Lohman, based on interviews
with licensed car scrappers, estimated that 60,000 to 120,000 cars were scrapped each year in
the South Coast Air Basin, a range he then refined to 75,000 to 100,000 scrapped cars annually.
See Lohmann Declaration, supra note 84, at 10.  Other SCAQMD staff concluded that an an-
nual average of 236,000 cars were scrapped from 1994 to 1997, based on statewide data re-
ceived by the Department of Motor Vehicles on junked cars, adjusted to account for ‘junked’
vehicles that were revived.  See South Coast AirQuality Management District, Presentation to
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credits should be counted from scrapping one of those thousands of
cars, since those reductions would have naturally occurred.  Since less
than 23,000 cars have been destroyed through the Rule 1610 program
in its five-year life, most of these cars are probably among those that
would have been destroyed even without the program.128  However,
market forces encourage people who were planning to scrap an old
car for its $50 value as scrap metal to obtain $600 for it through the
Rule 1610 program instead.129  This practice is encouraged in Los An-
geles because many licensed scrappers are operated jointly with
junkyards, where people bring their old cars to be destroyed.  While
this is rational economic behavior for the car owner, it creates false
emission credits.
According to Lohmann and SCAQMD, of the cars that were not
at the end of their lives, many were not regularly driven and would
not have been driven for another three years.  The Rule 1610 for-
mula, therefore, over-allocates emission credits generated by de-
stroying these cars.  Inspector Lohmann reported many cases in
which inoperable cars were brought to the car scrapping facility and
minor repairs were made solely for the purpose of obtaining the $600
payment from the scrapping program.130  Obviously, such inoperable
cars were not generating any pollution at all, but were merely col-
lecting dust in someone’s garage.  However, through Rule 1610, this
non-existent automobile pollution has turned into real VOC pollu-
tion released from oil tankers or other sources.
At least one study concludes that car scrapping programs like
Rule 1610 are incapable of generating any significant air pollution
reductions.131  Yet, the elaborate credit trading mechanism has fooled
the public into thinking that pollution is actually being reduced. Fur-
                                                                                                                                     
the Technology Committee Meeting (Apr. 24, 1998), reprinted in Lohmann Declaration, supra
note 84, Exhibit D, at 5; SCAQMD, Board Meeting June 12, 1998, supra note 126, at Attach-
ment D.
128. See Lohmann Declaration, supra note 84, at 10.
129. See id. at 7-9.
130. Id. at 7, 11-12.
131. See generally Carl B. Moyer et al., PERSPECTIVES ON VEHICLE SCRAPPING IN AIR
QUALITY PROGRAMS, DRAFT FINAL REPORT (July 1995) (prepared for California Electric
Transportation Coalition).  As the report’s abstract and summary states, “[I]t does not appear
likely than scrapping can provide a major attainment strategy for a federal ozone nonattain-
ment area classified as Extreme or Severe. . . .  New assessments of scrapping are beginning to
provide evidence that scrapping cannot become a major part of hydrocarbon and carbon mon-
oxide attainment plans, even if the programs can successfully target high-emitting vehicles
through remote-sensing or other measurement means.  The supply of vehicles. . . appears too
limited to yield much more than about one percent reductions in the inventories of these pol-
lutants.” See Bansal & Kuhn, supra note 89, at n.38.
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thermore, this elaborate mechanism may also mask more sinister
outcomes. Absent democratic accountability, a pollution trading
market creates financial incentives for fraud.132  If a company is able
to under-report its emissions, it can avoid purchasing costly pollution
credits.  If another company is able to falsely report a pollution re-
duction, it can then sell fraudulent pollution credits to other compa-
nies.  To combat similar fraud, agencies like the Securities Exchange
Commission were established to police various markets;133 however,
no such regulatory agency polices emissions trading markets.  The
evidence of massive fraud in Los Angeles, one of the most highly
regulated areas on the planet, suggests it may be extremely difficult
to avoid similar fraud in states or countries with much smaller, less
sophisticated regulatory agencies.
3. Distortion of the Market:  Hot Air and Phantom Reductions
In addition to fraud by market participants, “cap and trade”
strategies, like Los Angeles’ RECLAIM program, are plagued by a
broader form of institutional manipulation.  This manipulation takes
the form of ‘phantom reductions’ in air emissions — reductions that
exist on paper only.  Under RECLAIM, allowable emissions have
declined each year as required by regulation.134  However, because
emissions reduction credits were initially allocated in an amount sig-
nificantly inflated above actual emissions,135 early ‘reductions’ in
132. See ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF
MARKETS 49 (1997) (“Market values, ripped out of a broader context of socially shared norms,
declare that opportunism, cutting corners, taking advantage are not only legitimate but virtu-
ous, since squeezing out the maximum possible price that the market will bear maximizes effi-
ciency.”).
133. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Comission, The U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission: What It Is, and What It Does, (last modified Dec. 23, 1996) <http://www.sec.gov/
asec/asecart.htm>.  “The SEC is an independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial regulatory agency
with responsibility for administering the federal securities laws. The purpose of these laws is to
protect investors in securities markets that operate fairly and to ensure that investors have ac-
cess to disclosure of all material information concerning publicly traded securities . . . .  Often
referred to as the ‘truth in securities’ law, the Securities Act of 1933 requires that investors re-
ceive financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public
sale. This act also prohibits deceit, misrepresentations and other fraud in the sale of securities.
[The Securities Exchange Act of 1934] requires that investors have access to current financial
and other information regarding securities, particularly those that trade publicly on exchanges
or over-the-counter. This Act also prohibits companies, securities brokerage firms and others
from engaging in fraudulent and unfair behavior, for example sales practice abuses and insider
trading.” (emphasis added)  See id.
134. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,701; SCAQMD, RECLAIM Rules, supra note 62, at
Rule 2002(e)(1).
135. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,698-699; SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT,
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emissions were illusory.  In the first three years of the RECLAIM
program, actual industrial NOx emissions have declined by at most
three percent, while allowable emissions have been reduced on paper
by about thirty percent.136  In the global context, the term “hot air”
has been used to describe the vesting of certain countries like Russia
with excess credits.137  Not only does the trading in hot air credits rep-
resent illusory environmental gains, the excess allocation drives down
the price of credits, reducing the motivation to invest in actual emis-
sion reductions or technological innovation.
By inflating the initial allocation of credits, pollution trading
programs like RECLAIM tend to reward the worst polluters.  Rather
than allocate emissions credits based on current actual emissions lev-
els, SCAQMD allocated its initial round of credits based on historic
emissions levels.  SCAQMD allowed polluters to base their credit
allocation on the highest year of emissions out of the last five years,
because industry successfully argued that emissions should not be
capped at current levels due to an economic recession that affected
California before the RECLAIM program’s adoption.138
In response to industry pressure, SCAQMD issued over 40,000
                                                                                                                                     
supra note 112, at 42.
136. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 42.  At the time of
RECLAIM adoption, the aggregate rate of reduction of NOx emissions between 1994 and 2000
was established at eleven percent per year.  See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,701.
137. See Driesen, Cheap Fix?, supra note 8, at 60, n.328 (citing CHRIS ROLFE, TURNING
DOWN THE HEAT: EMISSIONS TRADING AND CANADIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL 311 (1998)).  Another California smog trading program, named “SEED,” is also
based on hot air emissions.  Under SEED, the Sacramento Metropolitan Air Quality Manage-
ment District (SMAQMD) issued pollution credits that were generated by the decommission-
ing of B-52 bombers that formerly flew out of the region.  The SMAQMD issued five tons per
year of VOC credits, representing the pollution that used to be released by the bombers.
Those credits have been purchased by companies including Intel, Campbell’s Soup, Aerojet,
and others, which have used to credits to avoid installing pollution control equipment.  How-
ever, the credits are pure “hot air.”  Destruction of the bombers was required under the
START treaty.  Therefore, their pollution would have been eliminated in any case.  As a result
of the SEED program, the B-52 pollution continues despite the fact that the bombers are gone.
In essence, they continue to pollute from the grave.  See Letter from Richard Drury et al.,
Communities for a Better Environment, to Carol Browner, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (June 12, 1998) (Re: Request that EPA Reject SMAQMD Rules 107, 204, and 205 (the
SEED Program)) (citing Chris Bowman, Mather’s B-52 Loss May Help Clean Air, SAC-
RAMENTO BEE, Sep. 1, 1996, at B1) (on file with authors).
138. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,699. The baseline allocation of pollution credits was
further inflated as a result of two other provisions of RECLAIM adopted at industry’s insis-
tence.  One allows industry to add emission reduction credits previously earned under the lim-
ited program in effect before RECLAIM to be added to their baseline allocation.  The other
provision, in a give away to the oil industry, allowed oil refiners to increase their baseline emis-
sions allocation to reflect the increased refinery pollution associated with reformulated fuels
production.
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tons of NOx and SOx credits more than it should have issued based on
actual emissions.139  This over-allocation of credits is a major reason
for RECLAIM’s poor performance in reducing pollution.140  The
RECLAIM trading program has achieved a slower rate of pollution
reduction than would have been achieved by the former technology-
based regulations.  For example, the current RECLAIM allocations
for NOx are projected to be greater in most years of the program than
the comparative allocations from the 1991 Air Quality Management
Plan (AQMP) that RECLAIM replaced.141  The RECLAIM alloca-
tions for NOx are also greater than the NOx allocations in the 1994
AQMP, which is the approved State Implementation Plan142 for air
pollution control in Los Angeles.143
According to a SCAQMD audit, over the first three years,
RECLAIM has produced barely discernible pollution reductions.144
In fact, during the first two years of RECLAIM, 1994 and 1995, NOx
and SOx emissions reportedly increased compared to 1993.
145  Only in
1996 were emissions reduced, and then by at most three percent from
1993 NOx levels and by less than ten percent from 1993 SOx levels.
146
This pattern contrasts sharply with the time period 1989-1993 when
NOx emissions from industrial facilities declined steeply, by approxi-
mately thirty-seven percent, as a result of technology-based control
regulations.147
Due to the over-allocation of RECLAIM trading credits, credit
prices are far below the level projected upon adoption.148  The logic of
139. See Letter from Jenal, Drury and Ramo to Lents, supra note 116 (citing an excess of
43,000 tons of NOx and SOx to be emitted over a ten-year period under RECLAIM compared
to the emissions projected under the Air Quality Management Plan that it replaced).
140. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 247 (RECLAIM
Advisory Committee members Gail Ruderman Feuer, Natural Resources Defense Council and
Tim Carmichael, Coalition for Clean Air, in April 16, 1998 letter appended to RECLAIM pro-
gram report and audit).
141. Id. at 29, 245-246.
142. A State Implementation Plan (SIP) details how compliance with the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards will be achieved in each air quality control region (AQCR).  To develop
a SIP, each state first has to determine existing and projected levels of the criteria air pollutant
in each AQCR within the state’s baoundaries.  See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 14, at 792-93.
143. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 29, 245-46.
144. See Steven Church, Report Gives Smog-Trading Program an F Grade, SAN BER-
NADINO COUNTY SUN, May 8, 1998, at B1; SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra
note 112, at id. at 42, 247, 252.
145. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 38.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 42, 247.
148. See id. at 53, 63.  For example, in 1997, average prices for NOx credits ranged from
266 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:231
supply and demand explains these low credit prices.  By flooding the
market with tens of thousands of surplus credits, SCAQMD made the
commodity nearly worthless.  In an ideal world with perfect informa-
tion, economists’ predictions concerning pollution reduction and
technology innovation149 under a trading regime might bear fruit.
However, because credit prices are so low due to this institutional de-
fect in the market, industry has more motivation to purchase cheap
credits than to invest in actual emission reductions or to develop in-
novative pollution control technologies.
With the supply of RECLAIM credits so far in excess of de-
mand, more than eighty-five percent of the NOx credits traded (in
tons) were sold for $0.150  Therefore, no rational company would re-
duce emissions when other facilities are giving credits away for free.
In fact, a company would be at a competitive disadvantage if it did
invest in pollution control in such a market.  SCAQMD ignored basic
economic relationships between supply and demand and prices151 in
the face of industry’s threats to abandon support for the proposed
RECLAIM program.152 Industry lobbyists claim that a slow-down in
pollution clean-up, resulting from an initial over-allocation of credits,
is the necessary price to obtain industry acceptance of emission limits
on their factories.153 This is a weak justification for RECLAIM’s poor
performance in reducing air pollution thus far.  Unfortunately, the
                                                                                                                                     
$227 per ton for current year credits to $1,880 per ton for year 2010 credits. See id. at 53. How-
ever, a 1993 analysis, on the eve of RECLAIM adoption, projected that 1997 NOx credits would
sell for $9,151 per ton while year 1999 NOx credits would command $11,257 per ton.  See id. at
63.
149. See infra Part III.C.
150. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 55-57.  A lot of these
transactions involved transfers from facilities to third-party brokers and then transfers back
again to the facilities when the brokers were unable to sell the credits for a price.  More than
400 trades have been recorded in which RECLAIM Trading Credits were actually sold for a
real price in the first three years of the RECLAIM program.
151. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law (I), supra note 10, at 1349.
152. See Marla Cone, Anti-Smog Plan Praised, Jeered as Hearings Begin; Environment:
Hours of Testimony Reveal Bitter Divisions over Pollution-Trading Concept.  Stakes are High
for Air Quality and the State’s Economy,  L. A. Times, Sept. 10, 1993, at A3.
153. C.W. Aarni, Chevron Products Company, justifies RECLAIM’s poor environmental
performance by stating that:
In order to implement RECLAIM, the emphasis of the District’s enforcement pro-
grams needed to shift from focusing on the concentration of NOx and SOx  emitted to
focusing on the total pounds of air contaminants emitted.  For the first time, under
RECLAIM, the mass of air contaminant emissions from industrial facilities is limited.
This is good for air quality because it creates a level of certainty regarding future
emissions.  It was, however, a major adjustment for the business community.  This
“shift in consciousness” needed to occur during the first few years of RECLAIM.  The
slight over-allocations in the first few years were necessary to allow the shift to occur.
SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 242.
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international community is seemingly poised to make this same mis-
take.
Originally, SCAQMD pledged that credit supply would exceed
demand for less than three years and that credit prices would rise
steadily, motivating significant investments in pollution control.  Now
the air district says that the crossover point, where supply begins to
fall below demand level, won’t be reached for NOx until at least 1999
and for SOx until at least 2001, six and eight years, respectively, after
the program was started.154  If this currently closed market becomes
open to credits earned from mobile and area source reductions, as
proposed,155 RECLAIM credit prices will remain depressed for many
more years to come.
Not only were the RECLAIM trading credits over-allocated,
they were given away, or grandfathered.156  In contrast, to internalize
the costs of air pollution and to create proper price signals, many
economists have called for an auctioning off of pollution credits to
the highest bidder.157  The fees paid for emission credits would func-
tion like pollution taxes to encourage further emission reductions
thereby saving money.158  Revenues could be used to fund monitoring
and enforcement of market trading rules and to compensate workers
and consumers who are adversely effected by the pass-through costs
of pollution permits.159  By giving away a public resource, pollution-
free air, for free rather than charging the highest price the market
154. See id. at 36, 247.
155. See supra Part II.A. on the Intercredit Trading proposal.
156. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,698.
157. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law (I), supra note 10, at 1343-46
(objecting to two features of technology-based regulation, that existing permits are free, and
they are non-transferable).  In calling for marketable permits to be auctioned by the govern-
ment, Ackerman and Stewart note that their “market reform will be opposed by businesses
who (despite their promarket rhetoric) will predictably resist the prospects of buying pollution
rights after all these years of polluting for free. . . .  See id. at 1344, n.27. “While it is possible to
design efficient auction systems that ameliorate, or eliminate entirely, the financial burdens
imposed upon polluters”, Ackerman and Stewart would “oppose these schemes on principle.”
See id. They “believe that just as firms are obliged to pay for other raw materials they require
for their production process, they should be obliged to pay for the air and water degrade.”  See
id.
158. See M. JEFF HAMOND ET AL., TAX WASTE, NOT WORK 68 (1997) (holding that auc-
tioning pollution permits and using the revenue to offset existing tax distortions would be pref-
erable to other approaches).
159. See J. ANDREW HOERNER, ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO OFFSETTING THE
COMPETITIVE BURDEN OF A CARBON/ENERGY TAX 28-29 (1997) (A grandfathered permit
system would place U.S. competitiveness at greater hazard than an auctioned permit system or
equivalent pollution tax because no new revenues would be generated to offset adverse eco-
nomic impacts on workers, consumers and businesses) (on file with authors).
268 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:231
will bear, SCAQMD has subsidized industrial pollution and missed
an important opportunity to harness market forces for environmental
improvement.160
Since its inception, the Los Angeles emissions trading experi-
ment has been wracked by fraud, manipulation, and subsidization of
the worst polluters.  Polluters have consistently under-reported their
actual emissions by the use of emissions factors.  Car-scrappers have
re-used the engines from ‘scrapped’ vehicles and have issued credits
for destroying inoperable cars, leading to a systematic over-reporting
of pollution reduction in the Rule 1610 program.  Finally,
SCAQMD’s program has flooded the market with emissions credits
by allocating pollution ‘rights’ based on a polluter’s highest historic
emissions level, depressing the market price of credits and removing
the incentive for innovation.  Instead of listening to market theorists,
RECLAIM trading credits were given away rather than auctioned.
RECLAIM has every indication of amounting to at least a ten-year
free ride of avoided emission reductions for the four hundred largest
polluters in the Los Angeles area.161
III. THE TROUBLE WITH TRADING
Some advocates and academics advance several arguments as
they push to expand reliance on pollution trading and supplant tech-
nology-based controls.  According to trading proponents, emissions
trading will provide equal or greater emissions reductions than a
technology-based regulatory regime at a much lower cost to industry.
They argue that emissions trading stimulates continuous technologi-
cal innovation to reduce emissions.  Furthermore, some contend that
160. SCAQMD does impose small fees on emissions to help fund its regulatory program,
but they are not set at high enough levels to change price signals to promote significant pollu-
tion reductions.  SCAQMD has adopted a fee schedule for the issuance of air quality permits to
stationary sources.  RECLAIM facilities are required to file Annual Emissions Reports and
pay annual fees based on their emission of air contaminants.  The fees help cover costs to
evaluate, plan, inspect, and monitor air quality efforts.  See South Coast Air Quality Manage-
ment District, Regulation III - Fees, Rule 301(o) (last modified July 1, 1998)
<http://www.aqmd.gov/rules/html/tofc3.html>; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40510 (West
1998).
161. Industry’s ten year “free ride” includes the two years that proposed industrial regula-
tions were shelved pending development of RECLAIM, and the six to eight years after
RECLAIM adoption that it will take for allocated emission credits to drop below actual emis-
sion levels.  Assuming that proposals to open up the closed RECLAIM market to interchange-
able credits prevail, the free ride for industrial stationary sources will continue.  See SCAQMD,
RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 41-42.
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the emissions trading approach will inspire meaningful public partici-
pation and promote democratic control of environmental policies.
Criticisms of pollution trading, some empirical and some theo-
retical, challenge the growing support for emissions trading as a uni-
versal policy cure for environmental ills.  Pollution trading, as prac-
ticed in Los Angeles, has produced immoral, unjust, and ineffective
outcomes.  These are inherent characteristics that flow from emis-
sions trading theory and practice.  In an ideal world, one that has per-
fect information and is free from market distortions, pollution trad-
ing might succeed.  However, the necessary conditions for pollution
trading’s success appear to be politically unacceptable to the large in-
dustrial polluters who seem to embrace trading as indefinite regula-
tory relief.162
What once was a wrong—polluting—is now a ‘right’.  The im-
morality of pollution trading lies in its treatment of a public resource,
pollution-free air, as a private commodity.  Instead of people having
the right to breathe free, businesses have the right to pollute as much
as they can afford.  Furthermore, pollution trading unfairly harms
minority and low income people by unfairly concentrating emissions
in toxic hot-spots.  Therefore, pollution trading conflicts with envi-
ronmental justice.  Should this call for moral and just pollution policy
remain unheeded, then, at least the ineffectiveness of pollution trad-
ing policies must receive close attention.  In Los Angeles, the emis-
sions trading strategy has weakened meaningful commitments to re-
duce air pollution; it has delivered more promises than
environmental progress.
The reality of pollution trading on the ground has not been as
rosy as the academics and economists predicted. The experience in
Los Angeles shows that, in economic terms, the emissions trading
market has been plagued by market failures like any other market.
These market failures have created pollution hot-spots and have al-
lowed trading fraud and anti-democratic outcomes.  These results oc-
curred in a region with vast human and financial capital, including
162. In 1996, industry actively opposed expansion of RECLAIM to 1,000 more industrial
facilities that emit VOCs because of concerns that significant industrial emissions reductions
would be required, which would limit economic growth in the region.  The South Coast Air
Quality Management District abandoned its proposal for RECLAIM VOC trading, instead
opting to expand open market trading of mobile and area source credits, which allow industry
to avoid reducing its own emissions.  See South Coast Air Quality Management District,
AQMD News - New Trading System Eyed: Air Board Shelves Expansion of Smog Trading
Market (last modified Feb. 23, 1999) < http://www.aqmd.gov/news1/Archives/vocr.html>; Marla
Cone, Anti-Smog Plan Appears Likely to Be Shelved, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1996, at A1.
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perhaps the largest and most sophisticated air pollution regulatory
institution in the world.  These difficulties came from the oldest
trading programs ever developed for urban air pollution, but they are
not unique to pollution trading in Los Angeles. Rather, similar con-
cerns and variations on the problems encountered in Los Angeles are
likely to be experienced in any market incentives program that relies
on trading in emission reduction credits.
A.  Morality and the ‘Right’ to Pollute
Although it appears to have become socially unacceptable to
discuss the morality of public policy, this poses an important obstacle
for pollution trading.  Pollution trading removes the social stigma as-
sociated with pollution. Rather than treating pollution as a social ill
that we should attempt to eliminate to the extent feasible, trading
programs turn pollution into another commodity, to be traded when
economically efficiency dictates.  What is wrong with polluting, when
only money for the required pollution credits stands between socially
acceptable behavior and socially aberrant activity?  As Sandel points
out, in a trading scheme, pollution becomes a right rather than a
wrong:
If a company . . . is fined for spewing excessive pollutants into the
air, the community conveys its judgment that the polluter has done
something wrong.  A fee, on the other hand, makes pollution just
another cost of doing business, like wages, benefits, and rent . . . .
The distinction between a fine and a fee for despoiling the envi-
ronment is not one we should give up too easily.  Suppose there
were a $100 fine for throwing a beer can in to the Grand Canyon,
and a wealthy hiker decided to pay $100 for the convenience.
Would there be nothing wrong in his treating the fine as if it were
simply an expensive dumping charge?163
A more elegant, if not romantic, sentiment about pollution
trading can be found in the words inspired by Chief Seattle nearly
150 years ago:
What is it that the white man wishes to buy, my people ask me?
The idea is strange to us.  How can you buy or sell the sky, the
warmth of the land, the swiftness of antelope?  How can we sell
these things to you and how can you buy them? . . . If we do not
163. See Michael Sandel, It’s Immoral to Buy the Right to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15,
1997, at A2.
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own the freshness of the air and the sparkle of the water, how can
you buy them from us?164
Ultimately, no regulatory program can survive if it does not gen-
erate morally acceptable outcomes.  Economic efficiency alone does
not create a sound basis for public policy if it results in immoral re-
sults such as toxic hot-spots in disempowered communities, fraudu-
lent emission reductions, or actual increases in pollution.  As domes-
tic environmental agencies and the international community consider
expanding pollution trading to combat regional pollution and global
climate change, the social and moral costs should be fully weighed,
not just the economic benefits.
B.  Environmental Injustice
Regardless of one’s views on pollution rights and wrongs, distri-
butional fairness, which lies at the heart of environmental justice
concerns, cannot easily be ignored.165  As opposed to a technology-
based regulatory strategy, pollution trading has higher public health
risks because it concentrates pollution in neighborhoods surrounding
polluters.  These neighborhoods tend to be low-income communities
of color.  Environmental injustice results when regional pollution
trading leads to disproportionate localized toxic exposures and risks
to low income communities, a majority of which are ethnic and racial
minorities.166
Although the movement for environmental justice and against
environmental racism was self-named as recently as the 1980s, rela-
tively powerless groups—immigrants, workers, women, poor peo-
ple—have had a long tradition of organizing to redress hazardous
living and working conditions in search of a cleaner, safer environ-
ment.167  The modern day environmental justice movement challenges
environmental policy makers and practitioners by emphasizing the
public health and human rights dimensions of environmental prob-
164. FRED PARRY, HOW CAN ONE SELL THE AIR? CHIEF SEATTLE’S VISION 48 (1992)
(inspired by Chief Seattle’s speech in December 1854 to Isaac I. Stevens, the new Governor
and Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the Washington Territories who was on a preliminary
field trip to the various tribes he was planning to force onto reservations).
165. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Fairness in Environmental Law, 27 ENVTL. L. 705,
711 (1997) (fairness should be the basis used in assessing proposed reforms affecting existing
environmental law).
166. See Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 83.
167. See GOTTLIEB, supra note 24, at 235 (by the early 1900’s ethnicity has emerged as a
significant though understated factor in how serious community and workplace environmental
hazards were experienced).
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lems and by demanding solutions which honor principles of social
and economic justice.168  The organized linkage of environmental pro-
tection with civil rights led to formal recognition by the Clinton ad-
ministration and EPA that addressing environmental justice was a
political imperative.169  The contested policy terrain of environmental
justice features tools that advance environmental justice, such as en-
forcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act against discriminatory
environmental decisions,170 and tools that weaken environmental jus-
tice protections, such as pollution trading.
The Los Angeles experiment shows that emissions trading pro-
grams can exchange small reductions in widespread pollution for in-
creased exposure to concentrated, and often more toxic, pollution in
the neighborhoods surrounding large industrial facilities.171  The re-
sulting exposures to low-income communities of color make this a
matter of environmental injustice.
The Los Angeles experience demonstrates how two Clinton
Administration priorities are in direct conflict—the promotion of en-
vironmental justice and the promotion of pollution trading.  The con-
cerns documented in Los Angeles test the Administration’s commit-
ment to environmental justice and its willingness to curb the excesses
of unrestricted pollution trading.  Over the last three years, the Na-
tional Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC),172 ap-
pointed by Administrator Carol Browner to advise EPA on environ-
mental justice matters, has adopted a series of resolutions raising
concerns related to pollution trading.173  An administrative complaint
168. At a seminal meeting of more than 600 environmental justice leaders, seventeen
“Principles of Environmental Justice” were adopted at the First National People of Color Envi-
ronmental Leadership Summit, held in Washington, D.C., in October 1991.  See generally Karl
Grossman, The People of Color Environmental Summit, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION: EN-
VIRONMENTAL JUSTICE & COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 272, 272-97(Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
169. See Exec. Order No. 12898, supra note 83; National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council, Welcome to the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council! (last modified Nov.
18, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/oeca/oej/nejac>.
170. See generally Michael Fisher, Environmental Racism Claims Brought under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act, 25 ENVTL. L. 285 (1995) (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides
a useful basis for litigation over environmental racism).
171. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
172. The National Environmental Justice Advisory Council was established as a federal
advisory committee in September 1993 to advise the EPA Administrator on environmental
justice.  See National Environmental Justice Advisory Council, Welcome to the National Envi-
ronmental Justice Advisory Council! (last modified Feb. 1, 1999) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/
oej/nejac/mainpage.html>.
173. See Letter from Haywood Turrentine, Chair, Natioanl Environmental Justice Advisory
Council, to Carol Browner, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Attach-
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has been filed with EPA under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
against SCAQMD for allowing discriminatory impacts under its Rule
1610 car scrapping program. 174  The alleged violation of the civil
rights of people exposed to excess pollution as a result of pollution
trading has highlighted the seriousness of the environmental justice
issues for the NEJAC and EPA.
Only recently has EPA acknowledged the legitimacy of the envi-
ronmental justice impacts associated with pollution trading.  They
concede that no proposed or existing pollution trading program con-
tains appropriate safeguards against concentrating pollution in low-
income communities of color.175  The concerns raised about hot-spots,
environmental justice, and the efficacy of the Los Angeles trading
programs have given pause to EPA’s plans to grant the necessary ap-
proval for new emissions trading programs.  Based on the Los Ange-
les experience, EPA has pledged to revise its guidance for Economic
Incentive Programs to ensure that the environmental justice impacts
of pollution trading are assessed in advance and prevented or miti-
gated.176
Whether this can be achieved remains to be seen.  Environ-
mental injustice may be an institutional feature of emissions trading
programs, because economic models do not have adequate means to
quantify values such as justice and fairness.177
                                                                                                                                     
ment (Mar. 11, 1998) (citing, for example, a resolution entitled Enforcement Resolution on [sic]
Concerning Study of Disproportionate Impacts of Pollution Trading Programs, which was
adopted by the National Environmental Justice Advisory Council (NEJAC) on Dec. 12, 1996)
(on file with authors).
174. See Bansal & Kuhn, supra note 89, at 18.  Communities for a Better Environment,
working with NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the Center on Race, Poverty and the Environ-
ment, filed the administrative complaint.  EPA’s Title VI implementing regulations forbid it or
its delegated agencies from taking actions that have “the effect of subjecting individuals to dis-
crimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex, or have the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program with respect to indi-
viduals of a particular race, color, national origin, or sex.” 40 C.F.R § 7.35(b) (1998) (emphasis
added).
175. See Perciaseppe, supra note 82.
176. See id.
177. See Eileen Gauna, Federal Environmental Citizen Provisions: Obstacles and Incentives
on the Road to Environmental Justice, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 27 (1995) (“The environmental jus-
tice movement adheres to a social justice perspective of environmentalism, while EPA and
many national environmental organizations adhere to a science and technology oriented per-
spective of environmentalism.  A scientific framework of risk analysis . . . is ill suited to address
social justice issues.”).
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C. Pollution Trading:  Many Promises, Poor Results
Although trading advocates have made few, if any, direct claims
related to environmental justice,178 they loudly assert emissions trad-
ing will reduce pollution, even perhaps better than dreaded command
and control regulations, and certainly at lower cost.179 Emissions
trading has not effectively reduced pollution and has stifled innova-
tion in new pollution control technology.  Some critics argue that
emissions trading does not ensure meaningful citizen participation or
democratic decision making.180  Furthermore, others have defended
the technology-based control strategy for its success in preventing
pollution181 and for its superiority to unproven regulatory reforms ad-
vanced in the name of efficiency.182  The technology-based approach
also tends to avoid monitoring troubles that plague the emissions
trading approach.
1. Pollution Trading Does Not Reduce Pollution Effectively
Pollution trading programs are not effective policy tools for re-
ducing air pollution, as seen in the results from the Los Angeles ex-
periment.183  Neither RECLAIM nor the car scrapping trading mar-
kets have significantly reduced air pollution, despite claims made to
the contrary upon their adoption.
Before RECLAIM was adopted, emissions of NOx from indus-
trial polluters dropped by about thirty-seven percent from 1989 to
178. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law (I), supra note 10, at 1350-51
(conceding that their proposed marketable permits system could allow the creation of relatively
high concentrations of particular pollutants in small areas within the larger pollution control
regions, i.e. “hot-spots”). While silent on the environmental justice implications of toxic hot-
spots, Ackerman and Stewart contend that tolerating hot-spots is also a defect of best available
technology regulations. See id. Nonetheless, the blindness of both systems to intraregional
variation is a serious concern, according to Ackerman and Stewart, “deserving of the highest
priority on the reform agenda.”  See id. at 1350-51, n.43.
179. See generally Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law (II), supra note 11;
Dudek and Palmisano, supra note 18.
180. See Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 343.
181. See Barry Commoner, A Reporter at Large: The Environment, THE NEW YORKER,
June 15, 1987, at 46, 46-52 (reporting major progress when environmental regulations have re-
quired prevention of pollution at its source, as opposed to control of pollution after its genera-
tion).
182. See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uni-
form Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270-71 (1985)
(questioning whether other regulatory approaches would really perform better in practice that
uniform standards).
183. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.-3.
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1993 as a result of technology-based regulations.184  However, from
1994 to 1996, the first three years of pollution trading, RECLAIM fa-
cilities had reported no more than a three percent reduction in NOx
emissions in aggregate from 1993 levels,185 compared to an initially
projected thirty percent aggregate reduction over the same time pe-
riod.186  It may be several years more before industrial emissions are
reduced further under RECLAIM.187  Foreshadowing the future of
VOC trading and inter-source trading, the car scrapping program has
reduced far fewer emissions than claimed, if any at all.188
Other pollution trading programs are likely to be plagued by
similar poor environmental performance.  Allocating emission credits
so that they exceed actual air pollution levels makes the inflated
baseline an attractive design criterion for policymakers under pres-
sure from industry to cut environmental costs.189  Therefore, low
credit prices and phantom reductions are certain.  The increased in-
centive to manipulate the numbers and engage in outright fraud will
further dampen environmental performance.
2. Innovation Suffers Under a Pollution Trading Regime
Understanding whether pollution trading has a positive or nega-
tive effect on technology innovation remains a critical point of con-
tention.190  Solving chronic threats to environmental health and cli-
mate stability requires the development of innovative technologies.191
184. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT,  supra note 112, at 42, 247.
185. See id. at 38, 42. (reported NOx emissions from 1989 to 1996).
186. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,701 (the aggregate rate of NOx reduction for all
RECLAIM sources will be about eleven percent per year).
187. See supra text accompanying note 161.
188. See Lohmann Declaration, supra note 121, at 26; SCAQMD, Board Meeting June 12,
1998, supra note 126, at Attachment D.
189. See supra text accompanying note 153; SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, su-
pra note 112, at 242 (the overallocations in RECLAIM in the first few years were necessary to
allow  industry to adjust to and accept the concept of mass emission caps); Driesen, Cheap Fix?,
supra note 8, at 64-66 (government officials eager to avoid accountability may treat emissions
trading as an opportunity to avoid making specific decisions about where reductions will come
from); Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 18, at 239-40 (paper trading, which refers to trading
emission credits that never existed or that reflect reductions that would have happened anyway,
has occurred but reforms can fix this abuse).
190. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law (I), supra note 10, at
1346 (trading promises to reward innovative improvements in existing cleanup technologies);
Driesen, Emissions Trading, supra note 6, at 334 (emissions trading discourages up front in-
vestment in innovation necessary to develop new technologies with some initial costs).
191. See Lester R. Brown & Jennifer Mitchell, Building a New Economy, in STATE OF THE
WORLD 1998, at 168-87 (1998); BARRY COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 79-
102 (1990).
276 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 9:231
Continuous improvement in clean production methods can signifi-
cantly reduce pollution from industry, consumers, transportation, and
the energy sector.192
Some academics argue that pollution trading encourages compa-
nies to reduce pollution beyond the minimum required in order to
earn emissions reduction credits which can be sold at a profit.193  This
will encourage some companies to innovate for self-gain.  Further-
more, since pollution trading programs give companies the flexibility
to meet reduction goals by any means, creative forces will be un-
leashed to develop innovative and cost-effective ways to comply.194
Together, the combined attributes of profit motive and regulatory
flexibility inherent in emissions trading programs will promote the
development of new pollution reduction technologies more quickly
than rigid mandates.195
In contrast, others have defended technology-forcing regula-
tions, which set a performance standard achievable by the best avail-
able control technology, citing its history of success in reducing pollu-
tion.196  In response to such firm command and control mandates,
industry has often innovated to meet and exceed the required emis-
sion reductions.197
Driesen argues that pollution trading will actually stifle innova-
tion by encouraging pursuit of cheap fixes rather than innovative and
192. The United Nations Environment Program has defined cleaner production as:
Cleaner production is the continuous application of an integrated preventive envi-
ronmental strategy applied to processes, products, and services to increase eco-
efficiency and reduce risks to humans and the environment. . . . Cleaner production
requires changing attitudes, responsible environmental management and evaluat-
ing technology options. . . . The goal of cleaner production is to avoid generating
pollution in the first place—which frequently cuts costs, reduces risks and identifies
new opportunities.
United Nations Environment Programme, Industry and Environment Office, A Definition For
Cleaner Production (last modified Apr. 3, 1998) <http://www.unepie.org/cp/cp_ginf.html>.
193. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental law (I), supra note 10, at
1341 (pollution trading creates a powerful financial incentive for those who can clean up most
cheaply to sell their permits to those whose treatment costs are highest).
194. See Dudek & Palmisano, supra note 18, at 234-36 (emissions trading creates incentives
to use existing technologies, production, process, operations and maintenance changes in new
ways that result in more emission control for less money).
195. See Robert N. Stavins, Harnessing The Marketplace: We Have to Do More with Less,
EPA J., May-June 1992, at 22; Hockenstein et al., supra note 3, at 15.
196. See Driesen, Emissions Trading, supra note 6, at 304 (“[M]ore demanding traditional
regulation often provides significant incentives to innovate.”).
197. See Nicholas A. Ashford et al., Using Regulation to Change the Market for Innovation,
9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 419, 420 (1985); Driesen, Emissions Trading, supra note 6, at 294,
298-99; see generally Commoner, supra note 181.
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enduring solutions.198  Under technology-based regulations, compa-
nies who face high marginal compliance costs are forced to innovate
to stay competitive.199  However, under pollution trading, these com-
panies instead are motivated to purchase emission reduction credits
to avoid reducing pollution.200  Through pollution trading, firms with
low marginal costs of compliance, rather than invest in innovative
technology, have a greater incentive to use existing pollution control
technologies or to pursue cheaper improvements in efficiency.201
Thus, pollution trading actually creates perverse incentives to avoid
innovation.
The RECLAIM program in Los Angeles provides a good exam-
ple.  The average cost of best available control technology for NOx
was about $12,500 per ton at the time RECLAIM was adopted.202
That is more than fifty times the average price of current 1997 NOx
credits under RECLAIM’s emissions trading program.203  Rather than
innovate, many large and some small firms have chosen to purchase
cheap credits.
The Rule 1610 car scrapping program has taken less than 23,000
old cars off the road.204  However, this has allowed industrial firms
that claimed car scrapping credits to avoid using existing or innova-
tive technology to reduce their emissions.  Also, scrapping old cars
has not enhanced the market for new automotive technology.  Many
of these cars were at or near the end of their normal life span anyway,
and the $600 payment for each scrapped car does not provide a seri-
ous incentive for a consumer to purchase an electric vehicle or even a
new, cleaner burning car.205  Therefore, in Los Angeles, pollution
trading programs have stifled new technology development by al-
198. See generally Driesen, Cheap Fix?, supra note 8 (trading discourages capital invest-
ment in technology innovation).
199. See id. at 42-43 (industry operators, who might have innovated to escape expensive
pollution control regulations, will tend to purchase emission credits instead).
200. See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law (I), supra note 10, at 1341
(Pollution trading creates a powerful financial incentive for those who can clean up most
cheaply to sell their permits to those whose treatment costs are highest).
201. See Driesen, Cheap Fix?, supra note 8 at 42-43.
202. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,703.
203. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 53.
204. See Lohmann Declaration, supra note 121, at 10.
205. See id. at 23; see generally SCAQMD, Board Meeting June 12, 1998, supra note 126.
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lowing industry to choose cheap fixes while little pollution reduction
has actually occurred.206
Additionally, some individual companies that reported actual
emission reductions relied on process changes that could have re-
sulted anyway under the previous technology-based regulatory re-
gime.  In a survey of those companies who reportedly installed pollu-
tion control equipment in order to comply with RECLAIM, 1,305
tons per year of NOx emissions were reduced.  By comparison, more
than 9,000 tons per year of NOx reductions took place in the same
time frame as a result of discretionary implementation of control
equipment initiated under the rules prior to RECLAIM.207  This illus-
trates how emissions trading has muted the incentive to innovate.
Contrary to the view of many academics, there are theoretical
reasons to doubt that significant innovation will take place under a
pollution trading regime.  Empirical evidence from Los Angeles
demonstrates that the incentive to innovate appeared to be much
stronger under a technology-based regulatory regime.  In short, emis-
sions trading has allowed industry to choose a cheaper option at the
expense of technological innovation and emissions reduction.
3. Public Participation Suffers Under a Pollution Trading
Regime
Public participation is a tenet of democratic government and en-
vironmental policy making.  Some academics argue that pollution
trading enhances meaningful public participation.  Yet, existing pol-
lution trading programs effectively exclude the public (and to a large
extent, government agencies) from the decision making process
about industrial pollution.
Most states have permitting procedures through which affected
community members can advocate for pollution control requirements
on facilities.  However, pollution trading allows facilities to avoid
those permit requirements—usually without the knowledge or in-
volvement of the affected community.  Pollution trades made pursu-
ant to Rule 1610 and RECLAIM are not subject to public review or
comment.  In fact, the public faces numerous difficulties finding out
what companies are trading to avoid compliance with pollution con-
206. See Marla Cone, AQMD Tightens Rules of Car Scrapping, Environment: Vehicles must
be roadworthy. Panel adds 100 compounds to list of restricted toxic chemicals, L.A. TIMES, July
11, 1998, at B3.
207. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 44-45.
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trol standards.208 For instance, RECLAIM credits can be purchased
from independent brokers, without any environmental agency or
public oversight.209  A company wishing to increase or continue its
pollution need only purchase the required credits on the open mar-
ket, without any public review or comment.  In this way, the demo-
cratic will, as represented in permit and regulatory requirements im-
posed after full public review and comment, can be reversed by a
simple economic transaction.
Sunstein, Ackerman, and Stewart hold that pollution trading
promotes democracy and public participation. However, under Rule
1610 and RECLAIM, company management decides whether to re-
duce emissions or to use pollution credits.210  Profit, not public health,
becomes the deciding factor.211 Thus, as Heinzerling notes, “in decid-
ing whether to adopt a trading program or some other regulatory
strategy, ‘democracy’ cannot be counted on the side of pollution
trading.”212 As Rule 1610 demonstrates, when “pollution trading pro-
grams do not assure meaningful citizen participation in decisions
about the environment, then the distributional objection goes unmet:
some non-consenting citizens must endure greater pollution, in the
service of reducing the overall costs of environmental compliance.”213
4. Monitoring and Enforcement are More Difficult Under a
Pollution Trading Regime
Pollution trading creates new difficulties concerning monitoring
and enforcement. Accurate accounting of actual emissions facilitates
an honest market in which emissions reduction claims are verifiable
and enforceable.  Pollution trading relies more on accurate emissions
accounting than does a technology-based strategy.  Yet, accurate
208. Public participation has proven very successful as a tactic to prevent and reduce pollu-
tion.  For example, the Toxic Release Inventory data which is required by the Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act has proven very successful in mobilizing public
opposition that has lead to pollution prevention and reduction.  See generally Luke W. Cole,
Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for Environmental Poverty
Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992);  Gauna, supra note 177.
209. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 55.
210. See SCAQMD, Offset Programs, supra note 60, at Rule 1610; SCAQMD, RECLAIM
Rules, supra note 62, at Rule 2000-2015.
211. Cf. Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 318 (noting that the history of the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments challenges the view that “establishing a system of marketable permits will pro-
mote democratic values, such as deliberation, decentralization, and freedom from faction. . . .
In reality, Congress paid little attention to [debating the overall pollution limits]. . . [and] the
1990 Amendments owes much of its content to the influence of special interest groups.”)
212. Id. at 343.
213. Id.
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monitoring requires costly investments in technology and intrusive
public accounting of chemical use data, measures traditionally op-
posed by industry.  And, of course, market theorists decry such ad-
ministrative requirements or other restrictions because they raise
transaction costs, thus interfering with the free hand of the market-
place.214  The RECLAIM program recognized the need to verify that
trading credits represented real emission reductions, not just progress
on paper.215  RECLAIM requires that major sources use continuous
emissions monitors (CEMs) to measure NOx and SOx releases from
industrial facilities.216  Despite the availability of this proven technol-
ogy for constantly measuring pollutants in industrial stacks, these
RECLAIM provisions were criticized by industry lobbyists because
of the additional costs associated with data reporting and the installa-
tion and operation of CEMs.  However, CEMs were required despite
industry opposition, underscoring the program’s intent to produce
the data that enables creditable tracking of emissions.217  To verify in-
dustry’s claimed reductions, the RECLAIM program requires CEMs
to monitor actual emissions from industrial stacks at major sources.218
However, an audit of the RECLAIM program found that indus-
try has been slow to comply with the CEM requirements.219  After the
first year, thirty percent of the RECLAIM facilities had still not in-
stalled properly operating CEMs.220  Although most CEMs are now
certified, electronic data reporting requirements were still being vio-
lated forty percent of the time by major sources, and eighty percent
214. See KUTTNER, supra note 132, at 6.
215. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,703-704; SCAQMD, RECLAIM Rules, supra note 62, at
Rule 2004(b).
216. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,704-705; SCAQMD, RECLAIM Rules, supra note 62, at
Rule 2012(c)(2)(A).
217. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,704-705; see also SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM
AUDIT, supra note 112, at 75; Southern California Gas Company, Position Paper: Regional
Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM) 2 (1993) (on file with authors). In the car scrapping
program, in contrast, it’s impractical to monitor emission reductions because the program is
based on projections of emissions avoided in the future.  As discussed above, these projections
have been grossly over inflated.
218. RECLAIM exempted smaller NOx and SOx sources from using continuous emissions
monitoring.  See SCAQMD, RECLAIM Rules, supra note 62, at Rule 2012. Instead, SCAQMD
relies on emissions factors for these smaller sources.  Such emission factors may be inaccurate
according to U.S. EPA, because some emissions factors are derived from tests that may vary by
an order of magnitude or more.  Even when the major process variables are accounted for,
emission factors developed may be the result of averaging source tests that differ by factors of
five or more.  See U.S. EPA , AP-42 , supra note 113, at 3.
219. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 76-77.
220. See id. at 77.
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of the time by small sources.221  As a result of poor compliance with
emissions reporting requirements and continued industry opposition
to comprehensive monitoring, SCAQMD’s ability to verify claimed
emission reductions from large sources of NOx and SOx remains in
doubt.
Emissions of VOCs are difficult to monitor accurately because
millions of sources release VOCs from everyday activities, and VOCs
evaporate into the air instead of being emitted from a stack.  VOC
trading was dropped from the original RECLAIM proposal because
the monitoring and enforcement challenges were so severe.222  CEMs
are impractical for pollutants with many individual sources, and
VOCs have multiple sources. For example, most VOC emissions are
from leaks from thousands of pieces of equipment (so-called fugitive
emissions) or evaporation from direct use of thousands of VOC-
containing products (e.g. spray paints).223
Claimed VOC emission reductions can best be verified through
source testing or a materials balance that accounts for all use of the
polluting material and all the releases of the same pollutant from all
sources.224  Tracking chemical use data provides the means of meas-
uring the major inputs of a polluting material.225  Industry, however,
has strongly opposed proposed policies to publicly report chemical
use data.  Air pollution agencies have traditionally sought to main-
tain as confidential the amount of chemicals used by individual indus-
trial plants, making independent verification impossible.
These monitoring concerns become more significant to public
health protection when the primary regulatory strategy is switched
from technology-based regulations to emissions trading.  Any ap-
proach needs to ensure that emission reductions are real and verifi-
able. Enforcement action cannot be taken in the absence of a strong
verification mechanism.
221. See id., at 84-85.
222. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,697.
223. According to the U.S. EPA, “there are hundreds of thousands of sources of VOC
emissions including automobile emissions, gasoline vapors, chemical solvents, and consumer
products like paint.”  See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality Plan-
ning and Standards, Regional Approaches to Improving Air Quality: Ground Level Ozone (last
modified Aug. 27, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/oar/oaqps/airtrans/groundoz.html>.
224. See U.S. EPA, AP-42, supra note 113, at 2-3.
225. See Ken Geiser, Rediscovering Materials Policy, in RETHINKING THE MATERIALS WE
USE: A NEW FOCUS FOR POLLUTION POLICY 13, 18-19 (Ken Geiser & Francis H. Irwin eds.,
1993). In one state where chemical use data reporting is required by law, better materials
tracking has resulted in pollution prevention and cost savings.  See generally KEN GEISER,
TRACKING POLLUTION PREVENTION PROGRESS IN MASSACHUSETTS: PART TWO (1996).
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Under the command and control technology-based approach,
emissions uncertainties are less relevant.  The important question is
whether the pollution control action was taken or not.  Regardless of
the pollution control strategy employed, it is a simple matter to verify
whether equipment was installed and is properly operating, or a
process changed or a raw material substituted.  Although uncertainty
remains over actual emissions, verification of compliance with tech-
nology-based pollution control requirements ensures that emissions
have declined, usually by significant amounts.
To avoid impeding the trading market, the RECLAIM program
verifies transactions after the fact and does not examine the under-
lying actions to ensure that claimed emission reductions are real.226
SCAQMD simply verifies that all the paperwork is in order after the
trade has already taken place.227  At the end of the allotted time pe-
riod, the agency ensures that enough emission reductions credits are
in hand at each facility to match the requirement to reduce emissions
by a certain percentage.228  Credits are based on claimed emission re-
ductions, which are subject to great uncertainty.229  In the trading pro-
gram, industry makes many diverse emission reduction claims.230
Even if significant agency resources were available, it is impractical
to verify that all emission reduction claims are real and accurate.
This diffusion of accountability for reducing emissions renders pollu-
tion trading programs inherently less enforceable than technology-
based regulations.231
Monitoring and enforcement issues are further complicated
when inter-source trading is allowed.  For now, RECLAIM is a
closed trading program where only stationary sources (larger indus-
trial plants) may participate.  However, pollution trading advocates
want to open the market so that industrial polluters can avoid reduc-
ing pollution further by using credits earned from emissions reduc-
tions from area sources (small, diverse sources, such as dry cleaners,
and spray can usage) and mobile sources (e.g. cars, trucks, and
buses).232  The Rule 1610 car scrapping program shows that stationary
226. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM Rules, supra note 62, at Rule 2004(b); see also Selmi, supra
note 55, at 10,702;.
227. See Selmi, supra note 55, at 10,704.
228. See id at 10,704; SCAQMD, RECLAIM Rules, supra note 62, at Rule 2004.
229. See discussion supra Part II (about emissions factors).
230. See SCAQMD, RECLAIM PROGRAM AUDIT, supra note 112, at 29.
231. See Driesen, Emissions Trading, supra note 6, at 303-04.
232. See SCAQMD, Air Quality Investment Program, supra note 74.
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to mobile source trading multiplies the potential for false claims of
reductions.233
Industrial polluters (i.e. stationary sources) want to continue to
avoid making investments in reducing their own emissions by taking
advantage of inter-source credits which represent grossly inflated
emission reduction claims or emissions that would have been reduced
anyway through actions that would be taken without trading.  In fact,
in order to meet environmental and public health goals, significant
reductions are needed from all sources.
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Having determined that pollution trading has serious empirical
and theoretical difficulties, we recommend a proposal for domestic,
urban pollution trading programs.  These recommendations are an
attempt to avoid the pit-falls associated with the Los Angeles pollu-
tion trading experiments.  However, pollution trading has increas-
ingly been recommended at the international level to combat global
climate change.234  The Los Angeles experience with trading has im-
portant implications for the international arena as well.  Finally, al-
ternatives to trading are discussed that may avoid some of the inher-
ent difficulties associated with pollution trading
A. Proposals for Urban Air Pollution Trading Programs
We propose a series of reforms for EPA to adopt in revising its
guidance on Economic Incentives Programs (EIPs), based on the
documented experience with pollution trading in Los Angeles.  These
measures would avoid or mitigate the problems reviewed in this arti-
cle.
1.  Prohibit Toxic Trading
The EIP should forbid the trading of toxic substances.235  This is
the most straightforward way to reduce the risk of creating toxic hot-
spots from pollution trading programs.  Such a rule would allow con-
tinued trading of other air pollutants not classified as toxic, such as
NOx and SOx, through programs such as the national acid rain trading
233. See discussion supra Part II.B.1-B.2.
234. See JONATHAN BAERT WIENER, DESIGNING GLOBAL CLIMATE POLICY:  EFFICIENT
MARKETS VERSUS POLITICAL MARKETS 5 (Center for the Study of American Business Policy
Study No. 143, 1997).
235. As defined in the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act.  See 42
U.S.C. § 11001 (1998).
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program or limited closed market programs such as the current
RECLAIM program.
2.  Prohibit Trading into Overburdened Communities
EPA should prohibit trading into overburdened communities.
Because industrial polluters tend to cluster in low income neighbor-
hoods and communities of color, allowing those sources to increase
pollution seriously threatens to further overburden such communi-
ties.  The burden on these communities should be measured by a cu-
mulative risk threshold that accounts for reproductive harm, cancer
risk, acute health risks, and risks to the most sensitive individuals,
such as children.  Such measurements should include the cumulative
risk from all facilities affecting a particular community.
3.  Assess and Prevent Toxic Hot-spots and Discriminatory
Impacts
EIPs should require a demographic analysis of affected commu-
nities before the approval of any trading program and should prohibit
trading programs that are projected to have a disproportionately ad-
verse impact on low-income communities of color.  Economic models
exist that allow agencies to accurately predict which facilities are
likely to purchase pollution credits, thereby increasing or continuing
their pollution, by comparing control costs across regulated source
categories.236  Facilities with low costs of control are likely to comply
with control requirements and generate pollution credits, while facili-
ties with high costs of control are likely to purchase pollution credits
and avoid installing pollution control equipment.  The model results
can be mapped to determine where pollution is likely to increase if a
revised trading program is approved, and whether low income people
of color are impacted.
4.  Prohibit Trading Out of Reasonably Available Control
Technology (RACT) Requirements
In order to ensure reasonable further progress, the EIP should
not allow industry to use trading programs in lieu of compliance with
pollution controls that constitute Reasonably Available Control
Technology (RACT).237  The Clean Air Act states that a fundamental
236. A model prepared by Regional Economic Modeling Inc. (REMI) has been used by
California’s South Coast Air Quality Management District for socio-economic impact assess-
ment as part of the development of Air Quality Management Plans, and could be adapted for
this purpose.  See generally Johnson & Pekelney, supra note 112.
237. See 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (1998).
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goal is to ensure pollution reduction at the source whenever feasible,
while one of the stated goals of the EIP is to foster technological ad-
vancements.  Allowing companies to trade out of compliance with
RACT rules undermines both of these goals.  Ensuring that all com-
panies install feasible technology (RACT) establishes a technology-
based floor to safeguard public health in all communities.
5. Prohibit Cross-Pollutant Trading
No facility should be allowed to increase or continue its emis-
sions of air pollutants by purchasing pollution credits generated
through reduced emissions of less hazardous pollutants.  This would
require a comparison of the chemical composition of the emissions
reduced for credit with the chemical composition of emissions main-
tained by purchase of credits to ensure that they represent equivalent
environmental impacts; this requires consideration of toxicity, co-
pollutants, and precursors.  Such cross-pollutant trading presents sub-
stantial risks of creating toxic hot-spots and increasing the overall
toxicity of pollutants released.
6. Allow Affected Communities to Review and Comment on
Proposed Trade
Any proposed pollution trade that will result in an increase or
continuation of toxic chemical emissions in a given community
should first be subjected to a public comment and review period, in-
cluding notification to the affected communities. This should be con-
ducted in accordance with the Model Plan for Public Participation
developed by EPA’s National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council (NEJAC).238  The agency administering the trading program
must retain discretion to reject or amend the proposed trade based
on community comments.
7. Ban Inter-Source Trading (between Mobile, Stationary and
Area Sources)
The only way to eliminate the environmental justice impact
caused by inter-source trading is to eliminate this form of trading.
Mobile to stationary source trading presents particular risks of toxic
hot-spot creation in communities of color and undercounting of emis-
sions.  Similar concerns would be presented by trading area source
238. See NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVISORY COUNCIL, PUBLIC PAR-
TICIPATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY SUBCOMMITTEE, THE MODEL PLAN FOR PUBLIC PAR-
TICIPATION 1-9 (1996).
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credits with stationary sources. Since these risks are inherent due to
the nature of the trading program, they must be eliminated. Station-
ary to stationary source trading as well as mobile to mobile source
trading would still be allowed.
8. Prohibit Hot Air Credits that Result from Over-Allocating
the Baseline
The initial allocation of credits for any emissions trading pro-
gram should be based on actual emissions, not historically higher lev-
els.  If trading proponents are truly committed to environmental im-
provement and economic efficiency, then they ought to rigorously
insist that the supply of credits not exceed the demand.  A glut in is-
sued credits depresses prices, stifles investments in pollution controls,
and misleads the public by making them think that emissions have ac-
tually been reduced.
B. Implications for the Climate Change Policy Debate
Many of the same problems documented in Los Angeles are
likely to be replicated internationally should pollution trading remain
the central strategy advanced for reducing greenhouse gases, like
carbon dioxide, to slow global climate change. Under global climate
change, the justice concerns take on a larger dimension and the sti-
fling effect of pollution trading on technological innovation has more
profound consequences.239
The hot air credits problem has already taken shape.  Since the
collapse of the Russian economy, that country’s carbon dioxide emis-
sions have dropped by more than thirty percent below 1990 levels.240
Under the Kyoto Accords, Russia will be granted emission credits as
if the economic collapse had never occurred.  This will allow Russia
to either increase its production levels, or to sell its thirty percent ex-
cess emission credits to other countries.  As a result, cash-rich, high-
polluting countries like the United States will be able to avoid politi-
cally painful decisions to reduce pollution domestically by purchasing
“hot air” credits from Russia.  The vast over-allocation of hot air
credits will even allow developed countries to increase emissions for
239. See Michael Belliveau, Smoke and Mirrors: Will Global Pollution Trading Save the
Climate or Promote Injustice and Fraud? CORPORATE WATCH (October 1998) (last modified
Mar. 1, 1999) <http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/feature/climate/pollution/belliveau.html>; see
generally Driesen, Cheap Fix?, supra note 8.
240. See generally CHRIS ROLFE, TURNING DOWN THE HEAT: EMISSIONS TRADING AND
CANADIAN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL (1998).
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years to come, without offsetting those increases by decreasing emis-
sions elsewhere.  Kyoto, therefore, provides a mechanism to allow
the United States, representing about five percent of the world’s
population, to continue generating the largest percent of the world’s
greenhouse gases, around 20%—a number that is increasing daily as
American consumers continue to buy ever larger cars and sport util-
ity vehicles.241
Environmental justice concerns will arise both domestically and
globally under global pollution trading.  Carbon dioxide sources re-
lease hazardous co-pollutants, e.g., fine particles and toxic products
of incomplete combustion.  As U.S. firms buy bogus Russian credits
or cheap reduction credits from developing countries, where energy
inefficiencies are high, air pollution in urban U.S. communities will
be maintained or at least not reduced as fast as it otherwise would
have been had domestic reductions in greenhouse gases been man-
dated.242
Developing countries lose twice in a pollution trading frame-
work.  Instead of receiving the capital investments necessary to de-
velop state-of-the-art clean energy technology, developing countries
will experience entrepreneurial “hit and run” projects aimed at
bleeding off the cheapest emission reduction credits possible.  Later,
during the next phase of global action when developing countries
which are locked in a fossil fuel-based development strategy must re-
duce their own greenhouse gases for the first time, they may be left
with few easy greenhouse gas reduction opportunities and with few
means to meet those reduction obligations.243
The World Bank, a heavy promoter of carbon intensive devel-
opment projects in the Third World, has positioned itself to profit as
a broker in the newly emerging market in greenhouse gas reduction
credits.244  More than three-fourths of the World Bank’s energy port-
folio is devoted to fossil fuels.245  Under a recently leaked proposal,
the bank plans to skim five percent from each trade it brokers in the
241. See G. TYLER MILLER, JR., LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT:  PRINCIPLES, CON-
NECTIONS, AND SOLUTIONS 56, 292 (8th ed. 1994).
242. See Belliveau, supra note 239.
243. See id.; see generally Driesen, Cheap Fix?, supra note 8.
244. See Daphne Wysham, Profiting from Pollution, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 22,
1998, at 1P; See generally Driesen, Cheap Fix?, supra note 8; THE SUSTAINABLE ENERGY AND
ECONOMY NETWORK (INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES, USA) AND THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADE INFORMATION SERVICE (USA), THE WORLD BANK AND THE G-7: STILL CHANGING
THE EARTH’S CLIMATE FOR BUSINESS (1998).
245. See Wysham, supra note 244, at 1P.
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global pollution credit market, which is projected to reach $150 bil-
lion in trading by 2020.246  This dual role will enable the World Bank,
along with its partner corporations, to “double dip”, profiting from
the expansion of inefficient fossil fuel technology in the developing
world, then again when easy efficiency improvements generate cred-
its that relieve responsibility for reducing emissions from industrial-
ized countries.247
U.S. interests are pushing hard for rapid creation of a global
pollution trading program, including proposed legislation in Congress
that would guarantee U.S. companies early credit greenhouse gas re-
duction projects while the details of the international pollution trad-
ing regime are being worked out.248
C. Alternative Market-Based Policy Approaches
Unfortunately, little consideration has been given to alternative
market-based policies, which suffer from few of the inherent limita-
tions of pollution trading.  If technology-based regulations were re-
tained as the floor, then supplementary market oriented programs
would accelerate the transition away from polluting technologies.  By
reforming subsidy programs to eliminate huge government invest-
ments in fossil fuels and other polluting technologies, and by redi-
recting investments toward clean technology, like solar electric and
hydrogen power, market forces would be reoriented to reduce pollu-
tion.249
Pollution taxes have been proposed as another market-based
approach to reduce pollution.250  Taxes could be increased on carbon
intensive fuels and other toxic products. The more pollution a facility
generated the higher its tax on emissions.  A variation on pollution
taxes, called tax shifting, would move taxes away from activities to be
encouraged, like wages and savings, and instead increase taxes on
polluting products and emissions to discourage environmental
246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See Industries Push for Emissions Credits: Firms Want to Ensure Credit for Reductions
of a Global Warming Treaty is Passed, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 3, 1999, at 6A.
249. See generally David Malin Roodman, THE NATURAL WEALTH OF NATIONS:
HARNESSING THE MARKET FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 29-110 (1998); LESTER R. BROWN ET AL.,
SAVING THE PLANET: HOW TO SHAPE AND ENVIRONMENTALLY SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 48-63 (1991).
250. See generally Frank Muller & J. Andrew Hoerner, Greening State Energy Taxes: Car-
bon Taxes for Revenue and the Environment, 12 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 5 (1994); HAMOND, su-
pra note 158.
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harm.251  By maintaining a progressive tax structure and using some of
the tax funds generated to compensate displaced workers and com-
munities impacted by the shift to clean technology, pollution taxes
could avoid any economic injustice in their implementation.252
Free market ideologues fervently embrace market incentive pro-
grams, like pollution trading, but tend to fall silent or oppose market
disincentives, like pollution taxes or the elimination of harmful sub-
sidies.  Given the results of pollution trading in Los Angeles, the de-
bate appears to be less about how to harness market forces to fairly
reduce pollution, and more about how to protect and enhance profits
for powerful economic interests.
CONCLUSION
An evaluation of the world’s oldest and largest pollution trading
programs for urban air quality reveals immorality, injustice, and inef-
fectiveness in their outcomes.  As demonstrated in Los Angeles, the
more unrestricted an emissions trading program, the more likely that
unjust hot-spot impacts, over allocations, and fraudulent transactions
will result. Yet reforms needed to improve the environmental per-
formance and mitigate the adverse impacts of pollution trading erase
the cost savings and regulatory flexibility touted by its advocates.
These reforms should be aggressively pursued, especially for current
and proposed smog trading programs.253  Serious restrictions are
needed on the proposed global pollution trading system to prevent
the worst abuses of an inherently flawed environmental policy tool.
However, protecting public health, civil rights, and economic security
would be better realized by halting further reliance on pollution
trading.  Instead, an effective floor of clean technology-forcing regu-
lations, enhanced by other market-based strategies such as subsidy
reform and progressive pollution taxes, provide the best means of en-
suring a just, participatory, and environmentally sustainable future.
251. See David Malin Roodman, Building a Sustainable Society, in STATE OF THE WORLD
1999, at 169, 171-74 (1999).  See generally HAMOND ET AL., supra note 158.
252. See generally HOERNER, supra note 159; Roodman, supra note 251.
253. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
